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Introduction
The first World Happiness Report was published 
in April 2012, in support of the High Level 
Meeting at the United Nations on happiness and 
well-being, chaired by the Prime Minister of 
Bhutan. Since then we have come a long way. 
Increasingly, happiness is considered to be the 
proper measure of social progress and the goal 
of public policy. This is the fourth World Happi-
ness Report, and it is different in several respects 
from its predecessors. These differences relate 
to timing, content and geography. 
In April 2015, we were already in the throes of 
planning for the World Happiness Report 2017, on 
the assumption that we would have, and need, 
somewhere between 18 months and two years to 
undertake the depth and range of research we 
wanted to cover. However we were invited to 
prepare a shorter report in 2016—the World 
Happiness Report 2016 Update—that would be 
released in Rome in March 2016, close to World 
Happiness Day (March 20th). Twelve months 
after that we plan to release World Happiness 
Report 2017, with the usual broad range of 
chapters based on global research, this time 
including separate chapters focused on two large 
global sub-populations, in China and Africa 
respectively. Further plans include deeper 
analysis of workplace happiness, and the happi-
ness implications of immigration, refugees, and 
transient populations.
Given the short time available since the launch of 
World Happiness Report 2015, this Update has only 
three chapters beyond this introduction, one 
from each editor. Chapter 2, by John Helliwell, 
Haifang Huang, and Shun Wang, contains our 
primary rankings of and explanations for life 
evaluations, significantly expanded this year to 
include analysis of the inequality of well-being, 
based on the distributions of happiness levels 
within and among societies. Chapter 3, by Rich-
ard Layard, deals with the links between happi-
ness and secular ethics. Chapter 4, by Jeffrey 
Sachs, discusses the close connection between 
happiness and recently agreed upon Sustainable 
Development Goals.
At the suggestion of our Italian hosts, and under 
separate editorial direction, we have this year, for 
the first time, a companion volume containing 
five research papers for presentation at the 2016 
launch conference in Rome—the 2016 Special 
Rome Edition. Four of the five papers are by 
Italian authors, and the other reviews a variety of 
links between human flourishing, the common 
good, and Catholic social teaching. We shall 
provide a brief overview of each after we first 
outline the contents and main findings of the 
World Happiness Report 2016 Update.
Chapter 2: The Distribution of World Happiness 
(John Helliwell, Haifang Huang, and Shun Wang)
In this report we give new attention to the 
inequality of happiness across individuals. The 
distribution of world happiness is presented first 
by global and regional charts showing the 
distribution of answers, from roughly 3,000 
respondents in each of more than 150 countries, 
to a question asking them to evaluate their 
current lives on a ladder where 0 represents the 
worst possible life and 10, the best possible. For 
the world as a whole, the distribution is very  
normally distributed about the median answer 
of 5, with the population-weighted mean being 
5.4. When the global population is split into ten 
geographic regions, the resulting distributions 
vary greatly in both shape and average values. 
Only two regions—the Middle East and North 
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean—
have more unequally distributed happiness than 
does the world as a whole. 
Average levels of happiness also differ across 
regions and countries. A difference of four 
points in average life evaluations, on a scale that 
runs from zero to ten, separates the ten happiest 
countries from the ten least happy countries. 
Three-quarters of the differences among coun-
tries, and also among regions, are accounted for 
by differences in six key variables, each of which 
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digs into a different aspect of life. The six factors 
are GDP per capita, healthy years of life expec-
tancy, social support (as measured by having 
someone to count on in times of trouble), trust 
(as measured by a perceived absence of corrup-
tion in government and business), perceived 
freedom to make life decisions, and generosity 
(as measured by recent donations). Differences 
in social support, incomes and healthy life 
expectancy are the three most important factors. 
International differences in positive and nega-
tive emotions (affect) are much less fully ex-
plained by these six factors. When affect mea-
sures are used as additional elements in the 
explanation of life evaluations, only positive 
emotions contribute significantly, appearing to 
provide an important channel for the effects of 
both perceived freedom and social support. 
Analysis of changes in life evaluations from 
2005-2007 to 2013-2015 continue to show big 
international differences in the dynamics of 
happiness, with both the major gainers and the 
major losers spread among several regions. 
The main innovation in the World Happiness 
Report Update 2016 is our focus on inequality. 
We have previously argued that happiness, as 
measured by life evaluations, provides a broader 
indicator of human welfare than do measures of 
income, poverty, health, education, and good 
government viewed separately. We now make a 
parallel suggestion for measuring and address-
ing inequality. Thus we argue that inequality of 
well-being provides a better measure of the 
distribution of welfare than is provided by 
income and wealth, which have thus far held 
centre stage when the levels and trends of 
inequality are being considered. First we show 
that there is a wide variation among countries 
and regions in their inequality of well-being, 
and in the extent to which these inequalities 
changed from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015. In the 
world as a whole, in eight of the 10 global 
regions, and in more than half of the countries 
surveyed there was a significant increase in the 
inequality of happiness. By contrast, no global 
region, and fewer than one in 10 countries, 
showed significant reductions in happiness 
inequality over that period.
Second, the chapter shows that people do care 
about the happiness of others, and how it is 
distributed. Beyond the six factors already 
discussed, new research suggests that people are 
significantly happier living in societies where 
there is less inequality of happiness. 
Chapter 3: Promoting Secular Ethics  
(Richard Layard)
This chapter argues that the world needs an ethi-
cal system that is both convincing and inspiring. 
To supplement what is seen as a global decline 
in the impact of religious ethics, the chapter 
offers the principle of the greatest happiness as 
one that can inspire and unite people from all 
backgrounds and cultures, and that is also in 
harmony with major religious traditions. But to 
sustain people in living good lives, more than a 
principle is needed. Living organisations are 
needed, including those already provided by 
many religions, in which people meet regularly 
for uplift and mutual support. To create secular 
organisations of this type in addition to religious 
institutions is an important opportunity to 
promote well-being in the 21st century. The 
movement known as Action for Happiness is 
used as an example to show both the need for 
and the power of collaborative action to design 
and deliver better lives.
Chapter 4: Happiness and Sustainable Develop-
ment: Concepts and Evidence (Jeffrey Sachs)
The year 2015 was a watershed for humanity, 
with the adoption of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) by heads of state at a special 
summit at the United Nations in September 
2015, on the 70th anniversary of the UN.
Sustainable development is a holistic approach to 
well-being that calls on societies to pursue 
economic, social, and environmental objectives 
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in an integrated manner. When countries sin-
gle-mindedly pursue individual objectives, such 
as economic development to the neglect of social 
and environmental objectives, the results can be 
highly adverse for human well-being, even 
dangerous for survival. Many countries in recent 
years have achieved economic growth at the cost 
of sharply rising inequality, entrenched social 
exclusion, and grave damage to the natural 
environment. The SDGs are designed to help 
countries to achieve a more balanced approach, 
thereby leading to higher levels of well-being for 
the present and future generations. 
This chapter shows that measures of sustainable 
development, including a new Sustainable 
Development Index prepared by the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network, help to account 
for cross-country variations in happiness, along 
the lines suggested by the analysis in Chapter 2 of 
this Report. In particular the SDG Index helps to 
account for cross-national patterns of happiness 
even after controlling for GDP per capita and 
unemployment . A measure of Economic Free-
dom, as proposed by libertarians, shows no such 
explanatory weight. The evidence suggests that 
indeed all three dimensions of sustainable devel-
opment—economic, social, and environmental—
are needed to account for the cross-country 
variation in happiness. 
The UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network has urged the inclusion of indicators of 
Subjective Well-being to help guide and measure 
the progress towards the SDGs. To this end, a 
letter from thirty global experts in well-being 
research—plus national and global statisticians 
with experience in collecting and using these 
data—has been sent to the UN Secretary Gener-
al, and to the committees responsible for moni-
toring the SDGs.
The 2016 Special Rome Edition  
(Edited by Jeffrey Sachs, Leonardo 
Becchetti and Anthony Annett)
As we have noted above, World Happiness Report 
2016—Special Rome Edition, separately selected 
and edited, was prepared for the March 2016 
launch event in Rome. The papers all have strong 
Roman links: the paper by Anthony Annett links 
Catholic social teaching with the work of other 
philosophers of well-being, while the other four 
papers are by Italian researchers dealing with a 
variety of issues in the analysis of well-being. We 
are immensely grateful to our Roman hosts for 
creating the launch event, and for contributing a 
variety of interesting papers. We provide below a 
brief description of each paper, and of its possi-
ble implications for the future development of 
global happiness research. 
Chapter 1: Inside the Life Satisfaction Blackbox 
(Leonardo Becchetti, Luisa Corrado and  
Paola Sama)
The authors propose the use of a package of 
domain measures of the quality of life to supple-
ment or perhaps even replace the overall life 
evaluations central to the World Happiness Report. 
They find that their package measure is more 
fully explained by a typical set of individual-level 
variables, and prefer it for that reason. They 
recommend, as do we, the collection of a broader 
range of variables that measure or arguably 
support various aspects of well-being. Only thus 
can the science of well-being be broadened and 
strengthened. However, to measure overall 
happiness, we continue to attach more validity to 
peoples’ own judgments of the quality of their 
lives than to any index we might construct out of 
possible component measures.
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Chapter 2: Human Flourishing, the Common 
Good, and Catholic Social Teaching  
(Anthony Annett)
This paper makes three claims. First, human 
beings are by their nature oriented toward 
broader notions of happiness that are intimately 
tied to the common good. Second, with the turn 
toward the individual, post-Enlightenment politi-
cal and economic developments have stripped 
the common good of all substantive content. 
Third, by restoring the centrality of the common 
good, Catholic social teaching offers a coherent 
and internally consistent framework for human 
flourishing that applies principles to particular 
circumstances in a way that does not depend on 
agreeing with the confessional claims of the 
Catholic Church. 
Chapter 3: The Challenges of Public Happiness: 
An Historical-Methodological Reconstruction 
(Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zemagni)
The central idea of this paper, drawn from 
Aristotle, is that there is an intrinsic value in 
relational and civil life, without which human 
life does not fully flourish. They contrast this 
broader conception of a good life, for which they 
see roots in the Italian civil economy, with what 
they see as narrower and more hedonistic 
approaches. The central role they ascribe to the 
social context—what they refer to as relational 
goods—has echoes in the empirical findings in 
the World Happiness Report, where the quality of 
social support and the excellence of civil institu-
tions are of primary importance, supplemented 
now by an apparent preference for equality of 
happiness.
Chapter 4: The Geography of Parenthood and 
Well-Being: Do Children Make Us Happy, 
Where, and Why? (Luca Stanca)
The author digs deeper into a frequent finding 
that having children does not add to the happi-
ness of their parents. The paper confirms a 
negative relationship between parenthood and 
life satisfaction that is stronger for females than 
males, and turns positive only for older age 
groups and for widowers. Looking across the 
world, a negative relationship between parent-
hood and life satisfaction is found in two-thirds 
of the countries studied. The negative effect of 
parenthood on life satisfaction is found to be 
significantly stronger in countries with higher 
GDP per capita or higher unemployment rates.
Chapter 5:  Multidimensional Well-Being in 
Contemporary Europe: Analysis of the Use of a 
Self-Organizing Map Applied to SHARE Data 
(Mario Lucchini, Luca Crivelli and Sara della Bella). 
The authors use a network-based mechanical 
data-reduction process to look for common and 
divergent features of 38 different well-being 
indicators collected from the same survey of 
older European adults that provided the data for 
the paper by Becchetti et al. They find that the 
measures of positive emotions tend to cluster 
together, as do the measures of negative emo-
tions. Overall life evaluations show a more 
umbrella-like character, with somewhat more 
kinship to the positive emotions. This seems to 
be consistent with the World Happiness Report 
2016 Update finding that positive and negative 
affect have quite different apparent impacts of 
life evaluations, being strongly positive for 
positive affect but only very slightly negative for 
negative affect. 
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Conclusion
In light of the limited time since the last report, 
the 2016 Update is shorter than usual. This year, 
as detailed in Chapter 2 of the Update, we 
provide a fuller accounting of the distribution of 
happiness among people within each country 
and region. Just as happiness provides a broader 
measure of well-being than separate accountings 
of income, health status, and the quality of the 
social context, we find that inequality of well-be-
ing provides a broader measure of inequality 
than measures focusing on the distribution of 
income and wealth. After documenting a general 
rise in the inequality of happiness, we present 
preliminary evidence that countries with more 
equal distributions of well-being have higher 
average life evaluations. This in turn invites 
broader discussions about the policies that might 
improve the levels and distribution of well-being 
within and among countries.
We also present in Chapter 4 some preliminary 
evidence that sustainable development is condu-
cive to happiness. We find that happiness is 
higher in countries closer to realizing the Sus-
tainable Development Goals, as approved by the 
nations of the world in September 2015.
To supplement our short World Happiness Report 
2016 Update, and to fuel the discussions at the 
three-day series of launch events in Rome, we 
have also issued the companion Volume 2—the 
World Happiness Report 2016 Special Rome 
Edition. This separately-edited volume compris-
es more technical papers, mainly prepared by 
our Roman hosts.
We are also in the midst of planning the next  
full report, the World Happiness Report 2017, 
which will include special chapters on happiness 
in Africa and in China, as well as analyses of 
happiness in the workplace and over the course 
of life. We also plan to extend our analysis of the 
inequality of happiness, and to dig deeper into the 
happiness consequences of international migration.
The cause of happiness as a primary goal for 
public policy continues to make good progress. 
So far, four national governments—Bhutan, 
Ecuador, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela—
have appointed ministers of happiness responsi-
ble for coordinating their national efforts. There 
are many more sub-national governments—
from large states like Jalisco in Mexico to many 
cities and communities around the world—that 
are now committed to designing policies en-
abling people to live happier lives. Experimenta-
tion is easier at the sub-national level, and this is 
where we expect to find the most progress. 
These local efforts are often supported by more 
encompassing organizations—such as the 
Happiness Research Institute based in Copenha-
gen and the Action for Happiness in the United 
Kingdom—designed to foster and transmit 
locally-inspired and delivered innovations. 
In these interconnected ways, we see increasing 
evidence that the emerging science of well-being 
is combining with growing policy interest at all 
levels of government to enable people to live 
sustainably happier lives. Our data show what 
needs to be done to improve the level and distri-
bution of happiness. We are encouraged that 
progress can and will be made.
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Introduction
It is now almost four years since the publication 
of the first World Happiness Report (WHR) in 
2012. Its central purpose was to survey the 
scientific underpinnings of measuring and 
understanding subjective well-being. Its main 
content is as relevant today as it was then, and 
remains available for those now coming to the 
topic for the first time. The subsequent World 
Happiness Report 2013 and World Happiness 
Report 2015, issued at roughly 18 month inter-
vals, updated and extended this background. To 
make this World Happiness Report 2016 Update 
accessible to those who are coming fresh to the 
World Happiness Report series, we repeat enough 
of the core analysis in this chapter, and its 
several on-line appendices, to explain the mean-
ing of the evidence we are reporting. 
Chapter 2 in World Happiness Report 2015, the 
Geography of World Happiness, started with a 
global map, and continued with our attempts to 
explain the levels and changes in average nation-
al life evaluations among countries around the 
world. This year we shall still consider the 
geographic distribution of life evaluations 
among countries, while extending our analysis 
to consider in more detail the inequality of 
happiness – how life evaluations are distributed 
among individuals within countries and geo-
graphic regions. 
In studying more deeply the distribution of 
happiness within national and regional popula-
tions, we are extending the approach adopted in 
Chapter 2 of the first World Happiness Report, in 
which Figure 2.1 showed the global distribution 
of life evaluations among the 11 response catego-
ries, with the worst possible life as a 0 and the 
best possible life as a 10 (the Cantril ladder 
question). The various parts of Figure 2.2 then 
made the same allocation of responses for 
respondents in nine global regions, weighting 
the responses from different countries according 
to each country’s population. In those figures we 
combined all the data then available, for the 
survey years 2005 through 2011, in order to 
achieve representative samples in each answer 
category. In this chapter we repeat that analysis 
using data from the subsequent four years, 
2012-2015. This will give us sufficiently large 
samples to compare what we found for 2005-
2011 with what we now see in the data for 
2012-2015. 
Our main analysis of the distribution of happi-
ness among and within nations continues to be 
based on individual life evaluations, roughly 
1,000 per year in each of more than 150 coun-
tries, as measured by answers to the Cantril 
ladder question: “Please imagine a ladder, with 
steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at 
the top. The top of the ladder represents the best 
possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder 
represents the worst possible life for you. On 
which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time?” We will, 
as usual, present the average life evaluation 
scores for each country, in this report based on 
averages from the surveys conducted in 2013, 
2014 and 2015. 
This will be followed, as in earlier editions, by 
our latest attempts to show how six key variables 
contribute to explaining the full sample of 
national annual average scores over the whole 
period 2005-2015. These variables include GDP 
per capita, social support, healthy life expectan-
cy, social freedom, generosity and absence of 
corruption. We shall also show how measures of 
experienced well-being, especially positive 
emotions, can add to life circumstances in the 
support for higher life evaluations. 
We shall then turn to consider the distribution of 
life evaluations among individuals in each coun-
try, using data from all 2012-2015 surveys, with 
the countries ranked according to the equality of 
life evaluations among their survey respondents, 
as measured by the standard deviation from the 
mean. We shall then show how these national 
measures of the equality of life evaluations have 
changed from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015.
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Our reason for paying more attention to the 
distribution of life evaluations is quite simple. If 
it is appropriate to use life evaluations as an 
umbrella measure of the quality of life, to supple-
ment and consolidate the benefits available from 
income, health, family and friends, and the 
broader institutional and social context, then it is 
equally important to broaden the measurement 
of inequalities beyond those for income and 
wealth. Whether people are more concerned with 
equality of opportunities or equality of outcomes, 
the data and analysis should embrace the avail-
ability of and access to sustainable and livable 
cities and communities as much as to income 
and wealth. We will make the case that the 
distribution of life evaluations provides an 
over-arching measure of inequality in just the 
same way as the average life evaluations provide 
an umbrella measure of well-being.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We 
shall start with a review of how and why we use 
life evaluations as our central measure of subjec-
tive well-being within and among nations. We 
shall then present data for average levels of life 
evaluations within and among countries and 
global regions. This will include our latest 
efforts to explain the differences in national 
average evaluations, across countries and over 
the years. After that we present the latest data on 
changes between 2005-2007 and 2013-2015 in 
average national life evaluations.
We shall then turn to consider inequality and 
well-being. We first provide a country ranking of 
the inequality of life evaluations based on data 
from 2012-2015, followed by a country ranking 
based on the size of the changes in inequality 
that have taken place between 2005-2011 and 
2012-2015. We then attempt to assess the possible 
consequences for average levels of well-being, 
and for what might be done to address well-being 
inequalities. We conclude with a summary of our 
latest evidence and its implications.
Measuring and Understanding  
Happiness
Chapter 2 of the first World Happiness Report 
explained the strides that had been made during 
the preceding 30 years, mainly within psychology, 
in the development and validation of a variety of 
measures of subjective well-being. Progress since 
then has moved faster, as the number of scientific 
papers on the topic has continued to grow 
rapidly,1 and as the measurement of subjective 
well-being has been taken up by more national 
and international statistical agencies, guided by 
technical advice from experts in the field. 
By the time of the first report there was already  
a clear distinction to be made among three main 
classes of subjective measures: life evaluations, 
positive emotional experiences (positive affect) 
and negative emotional experiences (negative 
affect); see Technical Box 1. The Organization  
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) subsequently released Guidelines on 
Measuring Subjective Well-being,2 which included 
both short and longer recommended modules of 
subjective well-being questions.3 The centerpiece 
of the OECD short module was a life evaluation 
question, asking respondents to assess their 
satisfaction with their current lives on a 0 to 10 
scale. This was to be accompanied by two or 
three affect questions and a question about the 
extent to which the respondents felt they had  
a purpose or meaning in their lives. The latter 
question, which we treat as an important sup-
port for subjective well-being, rather than a 
direct measure of it, is of a type4 that has come 
to be called “eudaimonic,” in honor of Aristotle, 
who believed that having such a purpose would 
be central to any reflective individual’s assess-
ment of the quality of his or her own life. 
Chapter 2 of World Happiness Report 2015 re-
viewed evidence from many countries and 
several different surveys about the types of 
information available from different measures 
of subjective well-being.8 What were the main 
messages? First, all three of the commonly used 
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life evaluations (specifically Cantril ladder, 
satisfaction with life, and happiness with life in 
general) tell almost identical stories about the 
nature and relative importance of the various 
factors influencing subjective well-being. For 
example, for several years it was thought (and is 
still sometimes reported in the literature) that 
respondents’ answers to the Cantril ladder 
question, with its use of a ladder as a framing 
device, were more dependent on their incomes 
than were answers to questions about satisfac-
tion with life. The evidence for this came from 
comparing modeling using the Cantril ladder in 
the Gallup World Poll (GWP) with modeling 
Technical Box 1: Measuring Subjective Well-being
The OECD (2013) Guidelines on Measuring Sub-
jective Well-being, quotes in its introduction the 
following definition and recommendation from 
the earlier Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic and Social Progress:
“Subjective well-being encompasses three dif-
ferent aspects: cognitive evaluations of one’s 
life, positive emotions (joy, pride), and nega-
tive ones (pain, anger, worry). While these as-
pects of subjective well-being have different 
determinants, in all cases these determinants 
go well beyond people’s income and material 
conditions... All these aspects of subjective 
well-being should be measured separately to 
derive a more comprehensive measure of peo-
ple’s quality of life and to allow a better under-
standing of its determinants (including peo-
ple’s objective conditions). National statistical 
agencies should incorporate questions on sub-
jective well-being in their standard surveys to 
capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic expe-
riences and life priorities.”5
The OECD Guidelines go on to recommend a 
core module of questions to be used by national 
statistical agencies in their household surveys:
“There are two elements to the core measures 
module. 
The first is a primary measure of life evaluation. 
This represents the absolute minimum re-
quired to measure subjective well-being, and it 
is recommended that all national statistical 
agencies include this measure in one of their 
annual household surveys.
The second element consists of a short series of 
affect questions and an experimental eudaimon-
ic question (a question about life meaning or 
purpose). The inclusion of these measures com-
plements the primary evaluative measure both 
because they capture different aspects of subjec-
tive well-being (with a different set of drivers) 
and because the difference in the nature of the 
measures means that they are affected in differ-
ent ways by cultural and other sources of mea-
surement error. While it is highly desirable that 
these questions are collected along with the pri-
mary measure as part of the core, these ques-
tions should be considered a lower priority than 
the primary measure.”6 
Almost all OECD countries7 now contain a life 
evaluation question, usually about life satisfac-
tion, on a 0 to 10 rating scale, in one or more of 
their surveys. However, it will be many years be-
fore the accumulated efforts of national statisti-
cal offices will produce as large a number of 
comparable country surveys as is now available 
through the Gallup World Poll (GWP), which 
has been surveying an increasing number of 
countries since 2005, and now includes almost 
all of the world’s population. The GWP contains 
one life evaluation as well as a range of positive 
and negative experiential questions, including 
several measures of positive and negative affect, 
mainly asked with respect to the previous day. 
In this chapter, we make primary use of the life 
evaluations, since they are, as we show in Table 
2.1, more international in their variation and are 
more readily explained by life circumstances. 
12
based on life satisfaction answers in the World 
Values Survey (WVS). But this conclusion, based 
on comparing two different surveys, unfortu-
nately combines survey and method differences 
with the effects of question wording. When it 
subsequently became possible to ask both 
questions9 of the same respondents on the 
same scales, as was the case in the Gallup 
World Poll in 2007, it was shown that the 
estimated income effects and almost all other 
structural influences were identical, and a more 
powerful explanation was obtained by using an 
average of the two answers.10 
It was also believed at one time that when 
questions included the word “happiness” they 
elicited answers that were less dependent on 
income than were answers to life satisfaction 
questions or the Cantril ladder. Evidence for that 
view was based on comparing World Values 
Survey happiness and life satisfaction answers,11 
and by comparing the Cantril ladder with happi-
ness yesterday (and other emotions yesterday). 
Both types of comparison showed the effects of 
income on the happiness answers to be less 
significant than on satisfaction with life or the 
Cantril ladder. Both conclusions were based on 
the use of non-comparable data. The first com-
parison, using WVS data, involved different 
scales and a question about happiness that 
might have combined emotional and evaluative 
components. The second strand of literature, 
based on GWP data, compared happiness 
yesterday, which is an experiential/emotional 
response, with the Cantril ladder, which is 
equally clearly an evaluative measure. In that 
context, the finding that income has more 
purchase on life evaluations than on emotions 
seems to have general applicability, and stands 
as an established result.12 
But what if happiness is used as part of a life 
evaluation? That is, if respondents are asked 
how happy, rather than how satisfied, they are 
with their life as a whole? Would the use of 
“happiness” rather than “satisfaction” affect the 
influence of income and other factors on the 
answers? For this important question, no defini-
tive answer was available until the European 
Social Survey (ESS) asked the same respondents 
“satisfaction with life” and “happy with life” 
questions, wisely using the same 0 to 10 re-
sponse scales. The answers showed that income 
and other key variables all have the same effects 
on the “happy with life” answers as on the 
“satisfied with life” answers, so much so that 
once again more powerful explanations come 
from averaging the two answers.
Another previously common view was that 
changes in life evaluations at the individual level 
were largely transitory, returning to their base-
line as people rapidly adapt to their circumstanc-
es. This view has been rejected by four indepen-
dent lines of evidence. First, average life 
evaluations differ significantly and systematical-
ly among countries, and these differences are 
substantially explained by life circumstances. 
This implies that rapid and complete adaptation 
to different life circumstances does not take 
place. Second, there is evidence of long-standing 
trends in the life evaluations of sub-populations 
within the same country, further demonstrating 
that life evaluations can be changed within 
policy-relevant time scales.13 Third, even though 
individual-level partial adaptation to major life 
events is a normal human response, there is 
very strong evidence of continuing influence on 
well-being from major disabilities and unem-
ployment, among other life events.14 The case of 
marriage is still under debate. Some recent 
results using panel data from the UK have 
suggested that people return to baseline levels of 
life satisfaction several years after marriage, a 
result that has been argued to support the more 
general applicability of set points.15 However, 
subsequent research using the same data has 
shown that marriage does indeed have long-last-
ing well-being benefits, especially in protecting 
the married from as large a decline in the 
middle-age years that in many countries repre-
sent a low-point in life evaluations.16 Fourth, and 
especially relevant in the global context, are 
studies of migration showing migrants to have 
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average levels and distributions of life evalua-
tions that resemble those of other residents of 
their new countries more than of comparable 
residents in the countries from which they have 
emigrated.17 This confirms that life evaluations 
do depend on life circumstances, and are not 
destined to return to baseline levels as required 
by the set point hypothesis.
Why Use Life Evaluations for  
International Comparisons of  
the Quality of Life?
In each of the three previous World Happiness 
Reports we presented different ranges of data 
covering most of the experiences and life evalua-
tions that were available for a large number of 
countries. We were grateful for the breadth of 
available information, and used it to deepen our 
understanding of the ways in which experiential 
and evaluative reports are connected. Our 
conclusion is that while experiential and evalua-
tive measures differ from each other in ways 
that help to understand and validate both, life 
evaluations provide the most informative mea-
sures for international comparisons because 
they capture the overall quality of life as a whole. 
For example, experiential reports about happi-
ness yesterday are well explained by events of 
the day being asked about, while life evaluations 
more closely reflect the circumstances of life as a 
whole. Most Americans sampled daily in the 
Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index Survey feel 
happier on weekends, to an extent that depends 
on the social context on and off the job. The 
weekend effect disappears for those employed in 
a high trust workplace, who regard their superi-
or more as a partner than a boss, and maintain 
their social life during weekdays.18 
By contrast, life evaluations by the same respon-
dents in that same survey show no weekend 
effects.19 This means that when they are answer-
ing the evaluative question about life as a whole, 
people see through the day-to-day and hour-to-
hour fluctuations, so that the answers they give 
on weekdays and weekends do not differ. 
On the other hand, although life evaluations do 
not vary by the day of week, they are much more 
responsive than emotional reports to differences 
in life circumstances. This is true whether the 
comparison is among national averages20 or 
among individuals.21 
Furthermore, life evaluations vary more between 
countries than do emotions. Thus almost 
one-quarter of the global variation in life evalua-
tions is among countries, compared to 
three-quarters among individuals in the same 
country. This one-quarter share for life evalua-
tions is far more than for either positive affect  
(7 percent) or negative affect (4 percent). This 
difference is partly due to the role of income, 
which plays a stronger role in life evaluations 
than in emotions, and is also very unequally 
spread among countries. For example, more 
than 40 percent of the global variation among 
household incomes is among nations rather 
than among individuals within nations.22
These twin facts – that life evaluations vary 
much more than do emotions across countries, 
and that these life evaluations are much more 
fully explained by life circumstances than are 
emotional reports– provide for us a sufficient 
reason for using life evaluations as our central 
measure for making international compari-
sons.23 But there is more. To give a central role 
to life evaluations does not mean we need to 
either ignore or downplay the important infor-
mation provided by experiential measures. On 
the contrary, we see every reason to keep experi-
ential measures of well-being, as well as mea-
sures of life purpose, as important elements in 
our attempts to measure and understand subjec-
tive well-being. This is easy to achieve, at least in 
principle, because our evidence continues to 
suggest that experienced well-being and a sense 
of life purpose are both important influences on 
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life evaluations, above and beyond the critical 
role of life circumstances. We shall provide 
direct evidence of this, and especially of the 
importance of positive emotions, in Table 2.1. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 of World Happiness 
Report 2015 we gave experiential reports a central 
role in our analysis of variations of subjective 
well-being across genders, age groups, and 
global regions. 
We would also like to be able to compare in-
equality measures for life evaluations with those 
for emotions, but unfortunately that is not 
currently possible, since the Gallup World Poll 
emotion questions all offer only yes and no 
responses. Thus nothing can be said about their 
distribution beyond the national average shares 
of yes and no answers. For life evaluations, 
however, there are 11 response categories, so we 
are able to contrast distribution shapes for each 
country and region, and see how these evolve as 
time passes. We start by looking at the popula-
tion-weighted global and regional distributions 
of life evaluations, based on how respondents 
rate their lives24. 
In the rest of this report, Cantril ladder is the 
only measure of life evaluations to be used, and 
“happiness” and “subjective well-being” are used 
exchangeably. All the analysis on the levels or 
changes of subjective well-being refers only to 
life evaluations, specifically the Cantril ladder.
The Distribution of Happiness 
around the World
The various panels of Figure 2.1 contain bar 
charts showing for the world as a whole, and for 
each of 10 global regions, the distribution of the 
2012-2015 answers to the Cantril ladder question 
asking respondents to value their lives today on 
a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible life as a 0 
and the best possible life as a 10. 
In Table 2.1 we present our latest modeling of 
national average life evaluations and measures 
of positive and negative affect (emotion) by 
country and year. For ease of comparison, the 
Table has the same basic structure as Table 2.1 in 
the World Happiness Report 2015. The major 
difference comes from the inclusion of data for 
late 2014 and 2015, which increases by 144 (or 
about 15 percent) the number of country-year 
observations.25 The resulting changes to the 
estimated equation are very slight.26 There are 
four equations in Table 2.1. The first equation 
provides the basis for constructing the sub-bars 
shown in Figure 2.2. 
The equation explains national average life 
evaluations in terms of six key variables: GDP 
per capita, social support, healthy life expectan-
cy, freedom to make life choices, generosity and 
freedom from corruption.27 Taken together, 
these six variables explain almost three-quarters 
of the variation in national annual average 
ladder scores among countries, using data from 
the years 2005 to 2015. The model’s predictive 
power is little changed if the year fixed effects in 
the model are removed, falling from 74.1% to 
73.6% in terms of the adjusted r-squared. 
Figure 2.1: Population-Weighted Distributions of 
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Figure 2.1: Population-Weighted Distributions of Happiness, 2012-2015 (Part 2)
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The second and third columns of Table 2.1 use 
the same six variables to estimate equations for 
national averages of positive and negative affect, 
where both are based on averages for answers 
about yesterday’s emotional experiences. In 
general, the emotional measures, and especially 
negative emotions, are much less fully explained 
by the six variables than are life evaluations. But 
the differences vary a lot from one circumstance 
to another. Per-capita income and healthy life 
expectancy have significant effects on life evalua-
tions, but not, in these national average data, on 
either positive or negative affect. The situation 
changes when we consider social variables. 
Bearing in mind that positive and negative affect 
are measured on a 0 to 1 scale, while life evalua-
tions are on a 0 to 10 scale, social support can be 
seen to have a similar proportionate effect on 
positive and negative emotions as on life evalua-
tions. Freedom and generosity have even larger 
influences on positive affect than on the ladder. 
Negative affect is significantly reduced by social 
support, freedom, and absence of corruption. 
In the fourth column we re-estimate the life 
evaluation equation from column 1, adding both 
positive and negative affect to partially imple-
Table 2.1: Regressions to Explain Average Happiness across Countries (Pooled OLS)  
Notes: This is a pooled OLS regression for a tattered panel explaining annual national average Cantril ladder  
responses from all available surveys from 2005 to 2015. See Technical Box 2 for detailed information about each  
of the predictors. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable Cantril Ladder Positive Affect Negative Affect Cantril Ladder
Log GDP per capita 0.338 -0.002 0.011 0.341
(0.059)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.058)***
Social support 2.334 0.253 -0.238 1.768
(0.429)*** (0.052)*** (0.046)*** (0.417)***
Healthy life expectancy at birth 0.029 0.0002 0.002 0.028
(0.008)*** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.008)***
Freedom to make life choices 1.056 0.328 -0.089 0.315
(0.319)*** (0.039)*** (0.045)** (0.316)
Generosity 0.820 0.171 -0.011 0.429
(0.276)*** (0.032)*** (0.030) (0.277)
Perceptions of corruption -0.579 0.033 0.092 -0.657





Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Number of countries 156 156 156 156
Number of observations 1,118 1,115 1,117 1,114
Adjusted R-squared 0.741 0.497 0.226 0.765
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Technical Box 2: Detailed information about each of the predictors in Table 2.1
1.  GDP per capita is in terms of Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011 
international dollars, taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) released by 
the World Bank in December 2015. See the 
appendix for more details. GDP data for 2015 
are not yet available, so we extend the GDP 
time series from 2014 to 2015 using coun-
try-specific forecasts of real GDP growth from 
the OECD Economic Outlook No. 98 (Edition 
2015/2) and World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospects (December 2014 release), after ad-
justment for population growth. The equa-
tion uses the natural log of GDP per capita, 
since that form fits the data significantly bet-
ter than does GDP per capita.
2.  The time series of healthy life expectancy at 
birth are constructed based on data from the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI). WHO 
publishes the data on healthy life expectancy 
for the year 2012. The time series of life ex-
pectancies, with no adjustment for health, 
are available in WDI. We adopt the following 
strategy to construct the time series of healthy 
life expectancy at birth: first we generate the 
ratios of healthy life expectancy to life expec-
tancy in 2012 for countries with both data. 
We then apply the country-specific ratios to 
other years to generate the healthy life expec-
tancy data. See the appendix for more details. 
3.  Social support (or having someone to count 
on in times of trouble) is the national average 
of the binary responses (either 0 or 1) to the 
Gallup World Poll (GWP) question “If you 
were in trouble, do you have relatives or 
friends you can count on to help you whenev-
er you need them, or not?” 
4.  Freedom to make life choices is the national 
average of binary responses to the GWP 
question “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied 
with your freedom to choose what you do 
with your life?” 
5.  Generosity is the residual of regressing the 
national average of GWP responses to the 
question “Have you donated money to a char-
ity in the past month?” on GDP per capita. 
6.  Perceptions of corruption are the average of 
binary answers to two GWP questions: “Is 
corruption widespread throughout the gov-
ernment or not” and “Is corruption wide-
spread within businesses or not?” Where data 
for government corruption are missing, the 
perception of business corruption is used as 
the overall corruption-perception measure. 
7.  Positive affect is defined as the average of pre-
vious-day affect measures for happiness, 
laughter and enjoyment for GWP waves 3-7 
(years 2008 to 2012, and some in 2013). It is 
defined as the average of laughter and enjoy-
ment for other waves where the happiness 
question was not asked. 
8.  Negative affect is defined as the average of 
previous-day affect measures for worry, sad-
ness and anger for all waves. See the appen-
dix for more details.  
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ment the Aristotelian presumption that sus-
tained positive emotions are important supports 
for a good life.28 The most striking feature is the 
extent to which the results buttress a finding in 
psychology, that the existence of positive emo-
tions matters much more than the absence of 
negative ones. Positive affect has a large and 
highly significant impact in the final equation of 
Table 2.1, while negative affect has none. 
As for the coefficients on the other variables in 
the final equation, the changes are material only 
on those variables – especially freedom and 
generosity – that have the largest impacts on 
positive affect. Thus we can infer first that 
positive emotions play a strong role in support 
of life evaluations, and second that most of the 
impact of freedom and generosity on life evalua-
tions is mediated by their influence on positive 
emotions. That is, freedom and generosity have 
a large impact on positive affect, which in turn 
has an impact on life evaluations. The Gallup 
World Poll does not have a widely available 
measure of life purpose to test whether it too 
would play a strong role in support of high life 
evaluations. However, data from the large 
samples of UK data now available does suggest 
that life purpose plays a strongly supportive role, 
independent of the roles of life circumstances 
and positive emotions.
Ranking of Happiness by Country
Figure 2.2 (below) shows the average ladder 
score (the average answer to the Cantril ladder 
question, asking people to evaluate the quality of 
their current lives on a scale of 0 to 10) for each 
country, averaged over the years 2013-2015. Not 
every country has surveys in every year; the total 
sample sizes are reported in the statistical 
appendix, and are reflected in Figure 2.2 by the 
horizontal lines showing the 95 percent confi-
dence regions. The confidence regions are 
tighter for countries with larger samples. To 
increase the number of countries ranked, we 
also include four countries that had no 2013-
2015 surveys, but did have a survey in 2012. This 
brings the number of countries shown in Figure 
2.2 to 157. 
The length of each overall bar represents the 
average score, which is also shown in numerals. 
The rankings in Figure 2.2 depend only on  
the average Cantril ladder scores reported by  
the respondents. 
Each of these bars is divided into seven seg-
ments, showing our research efforts to find 
possible sources for the ladder levels. The first 
six sub-bars show how much each of the six key 
variables is calculated to contribute to that 
country’s ladder score, relative to that in a 
hypothetical country called Dystopia, so named 
because it has values equal to the world’s 
lowest national averages for 2013-2015 for each 
of the six key variables used in Table 2.1. We 
use Dystopia as a benchmark against which to 
compare each other country’s performance in 
terms of each of the six factors. This choice of 
benchmark permits every real country to have a 
non-negative contribution from each of the six 
factors. We calculate, based on estimates in 
Table 2.1, a 2013–2015 ladder score in Dystopia 
to have been 2.33 on the 10-point scale. The 
final sub-bar is the sum of two components: the 
calculated average 2013-2015 life evaluation in 
Dystopia (=2.33) and each country’s own predic-
tion error, which measures the extent to which 
life evaluations are higher or lower than pre-
dicted by our equation in the first column of 
Table 2.1. The residuals are as likely to be 
negative as positive.29 
Returning to the six sub-bars showing the 
contribution of each factor to each country’s 
average life evaluation, it might help to show in 
more detail how this is done. Taking the exam-
ple of healthy life expectancy, the sub-bar for 
this factor in the case of India is equal to the 
amount by which healthy life expectancy in 
India exceeds the world’s lowest value, multi-
plied by the Table 2.1 coefficient for the influ-
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ence of healthy life expectancy on life evalua-
tions. The width of these different sub-bars then 
shows, country-by-country, how much each of 
the six variables is estimated to contribute to 
explaining the international ladder differences. 
These calculations are illustrative rather than 
conclusive, for several reasons. First, the selec-
tion of candidate variables was restricted by 
what is available for all these countries. Tradi-
tional variables like GDP per capita and healthy 
life expectancy are widely available. But mea-
sures of the quality of the social context, which 
have been shown in experiments and national 
surveys to have strong links to life evaluations, 
have not been sufficiently surveyed in the 
Gallup or other global polls, or otherwise mea-
sured in statistics available for all countries. 
Even with this limited choice, we find that four 
variables covering different aspects of the social 
and institutional context – having someone to 
count on, generosity, freedom to make life 
choices and absence of corruption – are togeth-
er responsible for 50 percent of the average 
differences between each country’s predicted 
ladder score and that in Dystopia in the 2013-
2015 period. As shown in Table 13 of the Statisti-
cal Appendix, the average country has a 2013-
2015 ladder score that is 3.05 points above the 
Dystopia ladder score of 2.33. Of the 3.05 points, 
the largest single part (31 percent) comes from 
GDP per capita, followed by social support (26 
percent) and healthy life expectancy (18 per-
cent), and then by freedom (12 percent), gener-
osity (8 percent) and corruption (5 percent).30
Our limited choice means that the variables we 
use may be taking credit properly due to other 
better variables, or to un-measurable other 
factors. There are also likely to be vicious or 
virtuous circles, with two-way linkages among 
the variables. For example, there is much evi-
dence that those who have happier lives are 
likely to live longer, to be most trusting, more 
cooperative, and generally better able to meet 
life’s demands.31 This will feed back to influence 
health, GDP, generosity, corruption, and the 
sense of freedom. Finally, some of the variables 
are derived from the same respondents as the 
life evaluations, and hence possibly determined 
by common factors. This risk is less using 
national averages, because individual differences 
in personality and many life circumstances tend 
to average out at the national level.
The seventh and final segment is the sum of two 
components. The first is a fixed baseline num-
ber representing our calculation of the ladder 
score for Dystopia (=2.33). The second compo-
nent is the average 2013-2015 residual for each 
country. The sum of these two components 
comprises the right-hand sub-bar for each 
country; it varies from one country to the next 
because some countries have life evaluations 
above their predicted values, and others lower. 
The residual simply represents that part of the 
national average ladder score that is not ex-
plained by our model; with the residual includ-
ed, the sum of all the sub-bars adds up to the 
actual average life evaluations on which the 
rankings are based.   
What do the latest data show for the 2013-2015 
country rankings? Two main facts carry over 
from the previous editions of the World Happi-
ness Report. First, there is a lot of year-to-year 
consistency in the way people rate their lives in 
different countries. Thus there remains a four-
point gap between the 10 top-ranked and the 10 
bottom-ranked countries. The top 10 countries 
in Figure 2.2 are the same countries that were 
top-ranked in World Happiness Report 2015, 
although there has been some swapping of 
places, as is to be expected among countries so 
closely grouped in average scores. Denmark, for 
example, was ranked first in World Happiness 
Report 2013, third in World Happiness Report 2015, 
and now first again in World Happiness Report 
2016 Update. In Figure 2.2, the average ladder 
score differs only by 0.24 points between the top 
country and the 10th country. The 10 countries 
with the lowest average life evaluations are 
largely the same countries as in the 2015 rank-
ing (identical in the case of the bottom 6). 
Compared to the top 10 countries in the current 
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2013-2015 (Part 2)
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Figure 2.2: Ranking of Happiness 2013-2015 (Part 3)
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ranking, there is a much bigger range of scores 
covered by the bottom 10 countries. Within this 
group, average scores differ by as much as 0.8 
points, or 24 percent of the average national 
score in the group. Second, despite this general 
consistency and stability, many countries have 
had, as we shall show later in more detail, 
substantial changes in average scores, and hence 
in country rankings, between 2005-2007 and 
2013-2015. 
When looking at the average ladder scores, it is 
important to note also the horizontal whisker 
lines at the right hand end of the main bar for 
each country. These lines denote the 95 percent 
confidence regions for the estimates, and coun-
tries with overlapping errors bars have scores 
that do not significantly differ from each other. 
Thus it can be seen that the four top-ranked 
countries (Denmark, Switzerland, Iceland, and 
Norway) have overlapping confidence regions, 
and all have national average ladder scores of 7.5 
or slightly above. The next five countries (Fin-
land, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand and 
Australia) all have overlapping confidence 
regions and average ladder scores between 7.3 
and 7.4, while the next two (Sweden and Israel) 
have almost identical averages just below 7.3.
The 10 countries with the lowest ladder scores 
2013-2015 all have averages below 3.7. They span 
a range more than twice as large as do the 10 top 
countries, with the two lowest countries having 
averages of 3.1 or lower. Eight of the 10 are in 
sub-Saharan Africa, while the remaining two are 
war-torn countries in other regions (Syria in the 
Middle East and Afghanistan in South Asia).
Average life evaluations in the top 10 countries 
are more than twice as high as in the bottom 10, 
7.4 compared to 3.4. If we use the first equation 
of Table 2.1 to look for possible reasons for these 
Technical Box 3: Changes in Gallup World Poll research methods
As part of Gallup’s effort to continue to improve 
its research methods and global coverage, there 
have been changes to the World Poll’s methods 
over time that may have an impact on the happi-
ness data.
In 2013, Gallup changed from face-to-face inter-
viewing to telephone surveying (both cell phone 
and landline) in Malaysia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
and Iraq. In addition, Gallup added interviews 
in English as a language of interview in addition 
to Arabic in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain in an effort 
to reach the large, non-Arab expatriate popula-
tion. Due to the three-year rolling average, this 
is the first report to no longer include face-to-
face data from those countries. In addition, Gal-
lup switched from face-to-face interviewing to 
telephone interviewing in Turkey in 2014. Cau-
tion should be used when comparing these data 
across time periods.
The United Arab Emirates was especially affect-
ed by the changes in survey methods, in part be-
cause of its newly sampled non-Emirati popula-
tion. This has caused its ranking to drop for 
technical reasons unrelated to life in the UAE. 
Where the expatriate population is very large, it 
comes to dominate the overall averages based on 
the total resident population. The UAE provides 
a good example case, as it has the largest popula-
tion share of expatriates among the Gallup coun-
tries, and has sample sizes large enough to make 
a meaningful comparison. Splitting the UAE 
sample into two groups would give a 2013-2015 
Emirati ladder average of 7.06 (ranking 15th in 
Figure 2.2), and a non-Emirati average 6.48 
(ranking 31st), very close to the overall average of 
6.57 (ranking 28th.)
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very different life evaluations, it suggests that of 
the 4 point difference, 3 points can be traced to 
differences in the six key factors: 1.13 points 
from the GDP per capita gap, 0.8 due to differ-
ences in social support, 0.5 to differences in 
healthy life expectancy, 0.3 to differences in 
freedom, 0.2 to differences in corruption, and 
0.13 to differences in generosity. Income differ-
ences are more than one-third of the total 
explanation because, of the six factors, income is 
the most unequally distributed among countries. 
GDP per capita is 25 times higher in the top 10 
than in the bottom 10 countries.32 
Overall, the model explains quite well the life 
evaluation differences within as well as between 
regions and for the world as a whole.33 However, 
on average the countries of Latin America have 
average life evaluations that are higher (by about 
0.6 on the 10 point scale) than predicted by the 
model. This difference has been found in earlier 
work, and variously been considered to repre-
sent systematic personality differences, some 
unique features of family and social life in Latin 
countries, or some other cultural differences.34 
In partial contrast, the countries of East Asia 
have average life evaluations below those pre-
dicted by the model, a finding that has been 
thought to reflect, at least in part, cultural 
differences in response style. It is also possible 
that both differences are in substantial measure 
due to the existence of important excluded 
features of life that are more prevalent in those 
countries than elsewhere.35 It is reassuring that 
our findings about the relative importance of the 
six factors are generally unaffected by whether 
or not we make explicit allowance for these 
regional differences.36
Changes in the Levels of Happiness
In this section we consider how life evaluations 
have changed. For life evaluations, we consider 
the changes from 2005-2007, before the onset 
of the global recession, to 2013-2015, the most 
recent three-year period for which data from the 
Gallup World Poll are available. We present first 
the changes in average life evaluations.
In Figure 2.3 we show the changes in happiness 
levels for all 126 countries having sufficient 
numbers of observations for both 2005-2007 
and 2013-2015.37 
Of the 126 countries with data for 2005-2007 
and 2013-2015, 55 had significant increases, 
ranging from 0.13 to 1.29 points on the 0 to 10 
scale, while 45 showed significant decreases, 
ranging from -0.12 to -1.29 points, with the 
remaining 26 countries showing no significant 
change. Among the 20 top gainers, all of which 
showed average ladder scores increasing by 0.50 
or more, eight are in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and Eastern Europe, seven 
in Latin America, two in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Thailand and China in Asia, and Macedonia in 
Western Europe. Among the 20 largest losers, 
all of which showed ladder reductions of 0.44 or 
more, five were in the Middle East and North 
Africa, five were in sub-Saharan Africa, four 
were in Western Europe, three in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, two in Asia and one in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.
These gains and losses are very large, especially 
for the 10 most affected gainers and losers. For 
each of the 10 top gainers, the average life 
evaluation gains exceeded those that would be 
expected from a doubling of per capita incomes. 
For each of the 10 countries with the biggest 
drops in average life evaluations, the losses were 
more than would be expected from a halving of 
GDP per capita. Thus the changes are far more 
than would be expected from income losses or 
gains flowing from macroeconomic changes, 
even in the wake of an economic crisis as large 
as that following 2007. 
On the gaining side of the ledger, the inclusion 
of four Latin American countries among the top 
10 gainers is emblematic of broader Latin 
American experience. The analysis in Figure 
25
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2013-2015 (Part 1)
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Happiness from 2005-2007 to 2013-2015 (Part 2)
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3.10 of Chapter 3 of World Happiness Report 2015 
showed that Latin Americans in all age groups 
reported substantial and continuing increases in 
life evaluations between 2007 and 2013. Five 
transition countries are also among the top 10 
gainers, matching the rising average life evalua-
tions for the transition countries taken as a 
group. The appearance of sub-Saharan African 
countries among the biggest gainers and the big-
gest losers reflects the variety and volatility of 
experiences among the 25 sub-Saharan coun-
tries for which changes are shown in Figure 2.3.
The 10 countries with the largest declines in 
average life evaluations typically suffered some 
combination of economic, political and social 
stresses. Three of the countries (Greece, Italy 
and Spain) were among the four hard-hit euro-
zone countries whose post-crisis experience was 
analyzed in detail in World Happiness Report 
2013. A series of recent annual declines has now 
pushed Ukraine into the group of 10 largest 
happiness declines, joining India, Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, two North African countries, 
Egypt and Yemen, and Botswana.
Looking at the list as a whole, and not just at the 
largest gainers and losers, what were the circum-
stances and policies that enabled some countries 
to navigate the recession, in terms of happiness, 
better than others? The argument was made in 
World Happiness Report 2013 and World Happiness 
Report 2015 that the strength of the underlying 
social fabric, as represented by levels of trust and 
institutional quality, affects a society’s resilience 
in response to economic and social crises. We 
gave Greece, which remains the biggest happi-
ness loser in Figure 2.3 (improved from World 
Happiness Report 2015, but still almost 1.3 points 
down from 2005-2007 to 2013-2015), special 
attention, because the well-being losses were so 
much greater than could be explained directly by 
economic outcomes. The report provided evi-
dence of an interaction between social capital 
and economic or other crises, with the crisis 
providing a test of the quality of the underlying 
social fabric.38 If the fabric is sufficiently strong, 
then the crisis may even lead to higher subjec-
tive well-being, in part by giving people a chance 
to work together towards good purpose, and to 
realize and appreciate the strength of their 
mutual social support; and in part because the 
crisis will be better handled and the underlying 
social capital improved in use. 
For this argument to be convincing requires 
examples on both sides of the ledger. It is one 
thing to show cases where the happiness losses 
were very big and where the erosion of the social 
fabric appeared to be a part of the story. But what 
examples are there on the other side? With 
respect to the post-2007 economic crisis, the 
best examples of happiness maintenance in the 
face of large external shocks are Ireland and 
especially Iceland. Both suffered decimation of 
their banking systems as extreme as anywhere, 
and yet have suffered incommensurately small 
happiness losses. In the Icelandic case, the 
post-shock recovery in life evaluations has been 
great enough to put Iceland third in the global 
rankings for 2013-2015. That there is a continu-
ing high degree of social support in both coun-
tries is indicated by the fact that of all the coun-
tries surveyed by the Gallup World Poll, the 
percentage of people who report that they have 
someone to count on in times of crisis is excep-
tionally high in Iceland and Ireland.39 
If the social context is important for happi-
ness-supporting resilience under crisis, it is 
likely to be equally applicable for non-economic 
crises. There is now research showing that levels 
of trust and social capital in the Fukushima 
region of Japan were sufficient that the Great 
East Japan Earthquake of 2011 actually led to 
increased trust and happiness in the region.40 
The happiness effects of crisis response may 
also be mediated through generosity triggered 
by a large natural disaster, with the additional 
generosity adding to happiness.41
What can be learned by using the six-variable 
explanation of Table 2.1 to explain happiness 
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changes between 2005-2007 and 2013-2015 in 
countries and global regions? We have per-
formed this exercise on a population-weighted 
basis to compare actual and predicted regional 
changes in happiness, and find that the equation 
provides a significant part of the story, while 
leaving lots of remaining puzzles. As shown in 
Table 31 of the Statistical Appendix, the model 
does best in explaining the average increase of 
0.4 points in the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, and the average decreases of 0.23 
points in Western Europe and North America & 
ANZ countries. For the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the gains arise from im-
provements in all six variables. For Western 
Europe, meanwhile, expected gains from im-
provements in healthy life expectancy and 
corruption combined with no GDP growth and 
declines in the other three variables to explain 
more than half of the actual change of 0.23 
points. The largest regional drop (-0.6 points) 
was in South Asia, in which India has by far the 
largest population share, and is unexplained by 
the model, which shows an expected gain based 
on improvements in five of the six variables, 
offset by a drop in social support.
The same framework can be used to try to 
explain the changes for the two groups of 10 
countries, the biggest gainers and the biggest 
losers. For the group of 10 countries with the 
largest gains, on average they had increases in 
all six variables, to give an expected gain of 0.29 
points, compared to the actual average increase 
of 0.9 points.42 For the group of 10 countries 
with the largest drops, GDP per capita was on 
average flat, expected gains in healthy life 
expectancy (which are driven by long term 
trends not responsive to current life circum-
stances) were offset by worsening in each of the 
four social variables, with the biggest predicted 
drops coming from lower social support and 
losses in perceived freedom to make life choices. 
Of the average loss equal to 0.8 points, 0.17 was 
predicted by the partially offsetting effects from 
changes in the six variables.
The World Happiness Report 2015 also considered 
evidence that good governance has enabled 
countries to sustain or improve happiness 
during the economic crisis. Results presented 
there suggested not just that people are more 
satisfied with their lives in countries with better 
governance, but also that actual changes in 
governance quality since 2005 have led to 
significant changes in the quality of life.43 For 
this report we have updated that analysis using 
an extended version of the model that includes 
country fixed effects, and hence tries to explain 
the changes going on from year to year in each 
country. Our new results, as shown in Table 11 of 
the Statistical Appendix, show GDP per capita 
and changes in governmental quality to have 
both contributed significantly to changes in life 
evaluations over the 2005 to 2015 period.  
Inequality and Happiness
The basic argument in this section is that in-
equality is best measured by looking at the 
distribution of life evaluations across those with 
very low, medium and high evaluations. If it is 
true, as we have argued before, that subjective 
well-being provides a broader and more inclu-
sive measure of the quality of life than does 
income, then so should the inequality of subjec-
tive well-being provide a more inclusive and 
meaningful measure of the distribution of 
well-being among individuals within a society.
However, although there has been increasing 
and welcome attention in recent years to ques-
tions of distribution and inequality, that atten-
tion has been almost entirely focused on the 
nature and consequences of economic equality, 
especially the distribution of income and 
wealth. The United Nations,44 the World Bank,45 
and the OECD46 have produced reports recently 
on the risks of rising economic inequality, and 
several prominent researchers have published 
recent books.47 All have concentrated on the 
sources and consequences of economic inequal-
ity, principally relating to the distribution of 
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income and wealth. There have also been 
studies of inequality of health care and out-
comes48, access to education, and equality of 
opportunity49 more generally. 
Much has and can be learned from these studies 
of inequality in different aspects of life. But 
would it not be helpful to have a measure of 
distribution that has some capacity to bring the 
different facets of inequality together, and to 
assess their joint consequences? Just as we have 
argued that subjective well-being provides a 
broader and more appropriate measure of 
human progress, so does the distribution of 
happiness provide a parallel and better measure 
of the consequences of any inequalities in the 
distribution of key variables, e.g. incomes, health, 
education, freedom and justice, that underpin 
the levels and distribution of human happiness.
In the middle of the 20th Century, Simon Kuznets 
surveyed data from economic history over the 
preceding decades to expose a pattern whereby 
economic inequality would increase in the early 
stages of industrialization, principally driven by 
the transfer of some workers from lower-paid 
rural to higher paid urban industrial jobs.50 He 
hypothesized that when this transfer was largely 
accomplished, attention would turn, as it did in 
many industrial countries in the middle decades 
of the 20th century, to the design of social safety 
nets, and more widely available health care and 
education, intended to spread the benefits of 
economic growth more evenly among the popula-
tion. Thus the so-called Kuznets curve, with 
economic inequality at first growing and then 
declining as economic growth proceeds. Among 
the industrial countries of the OECD, that pattern 
was largely in evidence for the first three-quarters 
of the 20th Century. But then, for reasons that are 
varied and still much debated,51 the inequality of 
incomes and wealth has grown significantly in 
most of these same countries. The OECD esti-
mates that during the period from the mid-1980s 
to 2013, income inequality grew significantly in 17 
of 22 countries studied, with only one country 
showing a significant decrease.52 
For the majority of the world’s population living 
outside the OECD countries, economic growth 
and industrialization has happened much later. 
This might suggest, if the Kuznets analysis were 
still to hold, that income inequality would have 
kept growing for longer before turning around. 
This appears to have been the case, with the 
United Nations reporting that for most countries 
in the world income inequality rose from 1980 
to 2000 and then fell between then and 2010.53 
World Bank data for subsequent changes in 
within-nation income inequality are still rather 
patchy, and show a mixed picture from which it 
is too early to construct a meaningful average.54
What are the consequences of inequality for 
subjective well-being? There are arguments 
both ethical and empirical suggesting that 
humans are or at least ought to be happier to 
live where there is more equality of opportuni-
ties and generally of outcomes as well. Beyond 
such direct links between inequality and subjec-
tive well-being, income inequalities have been 
argued to be responsible for damage to other 
key supports for well-being, including social 
trust, safety, good governance, and both the 
average quality of and equal access to health 
and education, - important, in turn, as supports 
for future generations to have more equal 
opportunities. Others have paid more direct 
attention to inequalities in the distribution of 
various non-income supports to well-being, 
without arguing that these inequalities were 
driven by income inequality.
If we are right to argue that broadening the 
policy focus from GDP to happiness should also 
entail broader measures of inequality, and if it is 
true that people are happier living in more equal 
societies, then we should expect to find that 
well-being inequality is a better predictor of 
average well-being levels than is the inequality of 
income. Comparative evidence on the relative 
information content of different measures of 
inequality is relatively scarce. For international 
comparison of the prevalence of poverty, an 
important channel though which inequality 
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affects well-being, it has been argued that 
people’s own subjective assessments of the 
quality of their lives, including access to food 
and other essential supports, should supplement 
and may even be preferable to the construction 
of poverty estimates based on the comparison of 
money incomes.55
Thus the broader availability and possibly more 
relevant measurement of well-being inequalities 
should help them to perform better as factors 
explaining life evaluations. There is, however, 
only a short span of historical data available for 
such comparisons. One recent study, based on 
data from the World Values Survey and panel 
data from several industrial countries, reported 
evidence of a ‘great moderation’ in the inequali-
ty of well-being, with downward trends evident 
in most countries.56 That was argued to repre-
sent a favorable outcome, on the assumption 
that most people would prefer more equality. 
The data we shall present later on recent trends 
in well-being inequality suggest a less sanguine 
view. Countries with significantly greater in-
equality of life evaluations in the 2012-2015 
period, compared to the 2005-2011 base period, 
are five times more numerous than countries 
with downward trends. 
A companion research paper57 compares income 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) 
with well-being inequality (measured by the 
standard deviation of the distribution of life 
evaluations), as predictors of life evaluations, 
making use of three international surveys and 
one large domestic US survey. In each case 
well-being inequality is estimated to have a 
stronger negative impact of life evaluations than 
does the inequality of income. To buttress this 
evidence, which is subject to the possibilities of 
measurement bias arising from the limited 
number of response categories, two ancillary 
tests were run. First, it was confirmed that the 
estimated effects of well-being inequality are 
greater for those individuals who said they wish 
to see inequalities reduced. 58 A second test 
made use of the established indirect linkage run-
ning from inequality to reduced social trust, 
with subsequent implications for well-being. If 
well-being inequality is a better umbrella mea-
sure of inequality than income inequality, then 
it might also be expected to be a better predictor 
of social trust. This is an especially appropriate 
test since the inequality of income has been a 
long-established explanation for international 
differences in social trust, 59 and several forms 
of trust have been found to provide strong 
support for subjective well-being. 60 In all three 
international surveys, trust was better predicted 
by a country’s inequality of life evaluations than 
by its inequality of incomes.61 These auxiliary 
tests provide assurance that there are likely to 
be real effects running, both directly and indi-
rectly, from well-being inequality to the level of 
well-being.
We have also tested the inequality of life 
evaluations and the inequality of income in the 
context of the equation of Table 2.1, and find a 
significant negative effect running from the 
inequality of well-being to average life evalua-
tions.62 The effects from income inequality are 
mixed, depending on which measure is used.63 
The strongest equations come from using the 
inequality of life evaluations along with the 
inequality of incomes varying each year based 
on the income data provided by the respon-
dents to the Gallup World Poll. Both inequality 
measures are associated with lower average life 
evaluations.64
Having presented evidence that the inequality of 
well-being deserves more attention, we turn now 
to consider first the levels and then changes in 
the standard deviation of life evaluations.65 For 
the levels, Figure 2.4 shows population-weighted 
regional estimates, and Figure 2.5 the national 
estimates for each country’s standard deviations 
of ladder answers based on all available surveys 
from 2012-2015. In part because we combine 
data from four years, to increase the sample 
size, we are able to identify significant in-
ter-country differences.66 The standard devia-
tions are negatively correlated with the average 
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ladder estimates,67 and we have already shown 
that they contribute significantly in explaining 
average happiness, above and beyond what is 
captured by the six main variables in Table 2.1. 
There is a positive correlation between income 
inequality and well-being inequality in our data, 
but we would naturally expect well-being in-
equality to be explained also by the inequalities 
in the distribution of all the other supports for 
better lives and it would be nice to be able to see 
if well-being inequality could itself be explained. 
Unfortunately most of the other supports for 
well-being are not yet measured in a way that 
can show the inequality of their distribution 
among members of a society.68 
Figure 2.4 shows that two regions – the Middle 
East & North Africa, and Latin America & 
Caribbean – have significantly more inequality 
of life assessments within their regions than is 
true for the world population as a whole. All of 
the other regions have significantly less inequali-
ty, with the three most equal regions, in order, 
being Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and East 
Asia. The fact that well-being inequality is 
greater for the world as a whole than in most 
global regions is another reflection of the fact 
that regions, like the countries within them, 
tend to have life circumstances that are more 
similar within the country or region than they 
are to conditions elsewhere in the world.
Figure 2.5 shows that the country rankings for 
equality of well-being are, like the regional 
rankings, quite different from those of average 
life evaluations. Bhutan, which ranks of the 
middle of the global distribution of average life 
evaluations, has the top ranking for equality. 
From an inequality average below 1.5 in Bhutan, 
Comoros and the Netherlands, the standard 
deviations rise up to values above 3.0 in the 
three most unequal countries, South Sudan, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia. The least unequal 
countries, as measured the standard deviation of 
life evaluations, contain a mix of countries from 
various parts of the happiness rankings shown 
in Figure 2.2. Of the 20 most equal countries, 
seven also appear in the top 20 countries in 
terms of average happiness. Of the 20 least 
equal, none except for Puerto Rico are among 
the top twenty in happiness, and most are in the 
bottom half of the world distribution, except for 
a few countries in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, where life evaluations and inequality are 
both higher than average.
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Figure 2.4: Ranking of Standard Deviation of Happiness 2012-2015, by Region
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Figure 2.5: Ranking of Standard Deviation of Happiness by Country 2012-2015 (Part 1)
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Figure 2.5: Ranking of Standard Deviation of Happiness by Country 2012-2015 (Part 2)
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Figure 2.5: Ranking of Standard Deviation of Happiness by Country 2012-2015 (Part 3)
Standard deviation 2012–2015 95% confidence interval






















































To measure changes in the distribution of 
happiness, we compare the standard deviation of 
life evaluations using all of the Gallup World 
Poll data from 2005 to 2011 (the period covered 
by our assessment of the inequality of subjective 
well-being in the first World Happiness Report) to 
the average for the four subsequent survey years, 
2012 to 2015.69 This is done for the world as a 
whole and 10 global regions in Figure 2.6, and 
for individual countries in Figure 2.7. In both 
figures we order the regions and countries by 
the size of the change in inequality from 2005-
2011 to 2012-2015, starting at the top with the 
regions and countries where inequality has 
fallen the most or increased the least. 
For the world as a whole, our population-weight-
ed estimates show inequality of well-being 
growing significantly from 2005-2011 to 2012-
2015, by an amount equaling about 5 percent of 
the estimated 2005-2011 standard deviation. The 
Latin American and Caribbean region shows an 
insignificantly small reduction in inequality, and 
Central and Eastern Europe an insignificantly 
small increase. All of the other regions show 
significant increases in well-being inequality.  
The two regions with the sharpest increases in 
inequality are the Middle East and North Africa 
and sub-Saharan Africa. The biggest relative 
increase in well-being inequality was in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, where it grew by 15 percent of its 
2005-2011 level. The corresponding increase was 
13 percent in the Middle East & North Africa.
Looking at the national-level inequality-change 
data for the 149 countries with sufficient data to 
make the calculations, about a tenth had signifi-
cant reductions in happiness inequality, while 
more than half had significant increases. The 
remaining one-third of countries showed no 
significant change. It is perhaps noteworthy that 
Iceland, the country showing the second largest 
reduction in inequality, was a country that was 
facing a deep banking crisis in 2008, but had 
managed to accept the consequences and rebuild 
average happiness by 2012-2013, when the 
second round of surveys was taken. 70 Iceland was 
noted earlier to have a very high fraction of the 
population having someone they could count on 
in times of trouble; the build-up and aftermath of 
the banking crisis put the Icelandic social fabric 
to a serious test. The subsequent recovery of 
average happiness suggests that the test was 
passed. It is perhaps significant that the happiness 
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Figure 2.6: Changes in Population-Weighted Standard Deviation of Happiness from 2005-2011 to 
2012-2015, for the World and 10 Regions
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Figure 2.7:  Changes in Standard Deviation of Happiness from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015 (Part 1)
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Figure 2.7: Changes in Standard Deviation of Happiness from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015 (Part 2)
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Figure 2.7: Changes in Standard Deviation of Happiness from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015 (Part 3)
Changes in standard deviation 95% confidence interval
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inequality created in part by the banking boom 
and bust was erased in the subsequent recovery 
of well-being, suggesting a high degree of social 
resilience in Iceland.
The 10 countries with the largest increases in 
well-being inequality have all been undergoing 
significant political, social and economic diffi-
culties. To what extent these inequality increases 
can be explained by changes in the underlying 
inequalities of income, social supports, health, 
generosity, corruption, freedom cannot be 
estimated on the basis of data currently avail-
able. This is because many of the key variables 
are not yet measured using scales with sufficient 
numbers of categories to permit measures of 
their inequality to be computed. Thus there 
remains much to be learned. It is perhaps 
enough, at this stage, to have made the case for 
taking well-being inequality seriously, and to 
have provided evidence on its levels and trends 
in nations, regions, and the world.
Summary and Conclusions
In presenting and explaining the national-level 
data in this chapter, we make primary use of 
people’s own reports of the quality of their lives, 
as measured on a scale with 10 representing the 
best possible life and 0 the worst. We average 
their reports for the years 2013 to 2015, provid-
ing a typical national sample size of 3,000. We 
then rank these data for 157 countries, as shown 
in Figure 2.2. The 10 top countries are once 
again all small or medium-sized western indus-
trial countries, of which seven are in Western 
Europe. Beyond the first ten, the geography 
immediately becomes more varied, with the 
second 10 including countries from four of the 
10 global regions. 
In the top 10 countries, life evaluations average 
7.4 on the 0 to 10 scale, while for the bottom 10 
the average is less than half that, at 3.4. The 
lowest countries are typically marked by low 
values on all of the six variables used here to 
explain international differences – GDP per 
capita, healthy life expectancy, social support, 
freedom, generosity and absence of corruption – 
and often subject in addition to violence and 
disease. Of the 4-point gap between the 10 top 
and 10 bottom countries, more than three-quar-
ters is accounted for by differences in the six 
variables, with GDP per capita, social support and 
healthy life expectancy the largest contributors.
When we turn to consider life evaluation chang-
es for 126 countries between 2005-2007 and 
2013-2015, we see lots of evidence of movement, 
including 55 significant gainers and 45 signifi-
cant losers. Gainers especially outnumber losers 
in Latin America, the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States and Central and Eastern Europe. 
Losers outnumber gainers in Western Europe 
and to a lesser extent in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Middle East and North Africa. Changes in the 
six key variables explain a significant proportion 
of these changes, although the magnitude and 
natures of the crises facing nations since 2005 
have been such as to move some countries into 
poorly charted waters. We continue to see 
evidence that major crises have the potential to 
alter life evaluations in quite different ways 
according to the quality of the social and institu-
tional infrastructure. In particular, as shown in 
World Happiness Report 2013 and World Happiness 
Report 2015, there is evidence that a crisis im-
posed on a weak institutional structure can 
actually further damage the quality of the sup-
porting social fabric if the crisis triggers blame 
and strife rather than co-operation and repair. 
On the other hand, economic crises and natural 
disasters can, if the underlying institutions are 
of sufficient quality, lead to improvements rather 
than damage to the social fabric.71 These im-
provements not only ensure better responses to 
the crisis, but also have substantial additional 
happiness returns, since people place real value 
to feeling that they belong to a caring and 
effective community. 
With respect to the inequality of well-being, as 
measured by the standard deviation of life 
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evaluations within each country, we find that it 
varies among countries quite differently from 
average happiness, and from the inequality of 
income. We have argued that just as subjective 
well-being provides a broader and more inclu-
sive measure of the quality of life than does 
income, then so should the inequality of subjec-
tive well-being provide a more inclusive and 
meaningful measure of the distribution of 
well-being among individuals within a society. 
We then measured changes since the 2005-2011 
averages reported in the first World Happiness 
Report. We find, in contrast to some earlier 
evidence of global convergence in happiness 
equality, that from the first to the second half of 
our data there has been increased inequality of 
happiness within most countries, almost all 
regions, and for the world as a whole. Only 
one-tenth of countries showed a significant 
reduction in happiness inequality, while more 
than half showed a significant increase. The 
world as a whole and 8 of 10 global regions 
showed significant increases in well-being 
inequality from 2005-2011 to 2012-2015. We also 
found evidence that greater inequality of well-be-
ing contributes to lower average well-being.
Discussions about the inequality of income and 
wealth, and what to do about them, typically 
include reference to the transfer of resources 
from richer to poorer to achieve greater equality. 
Increasing the equality of happiness does not in 
general require transfer, since building happi-
ness for some does not require reduction in the 
happiness of others. Indeed, one of the side 
benefits of broadening the focus of policy atten-
tion from income and wealth to subjective 
well-being is that there are many more options 
for improving average happiness, and increasing 
equality by improving the lot of those at the 
bottom, without others being worse off. 
Targeting the non-material sources of well-be-
ing, which is encouraged by considering a 
broader measure of well-being, opens possibili-
ties for increasing happiness while simultane-
ously reducing stress on scarce material resourc-
es. Much more research is needed to fully 
understand the interplay of factors that deter-
mine the inequality of well-being, but there is 
every hope that simply changing the focus from 
income inequality to well-being inequality will 
speed the arrival of a time when the distribution 
of well-being can be improved, for the benefit of 
current and future generations in all countries.
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1    Diener, Lucas, & Oishi (2016) estimate the number of new 
scientific articles on subjective well-being to have grown by 
about two orders of magnitude in the past 25 years, from 
about 130 per year in 1980 to almost 15,000 in 2014.
2    See OECD (2013).
3    As foreshadowed by an OECD case study in the first WHR, 
and more fully explained in the OECD Chapter in WHR 
2013. See Durand & Smith (2013).
4    See Ryff & Singer (2008). The first use of a question about 
life meaning or purpose in a large-scale international survey 
was in the Gallup World Poll waves of 2006 and 2007. It 
was also introduced in the third round of the European 
Social Survey (Huppert et al. 2009). It has since become 
one of the four key well-being questions asked by the UK 
Office for National Statistics (Hicks, Tinkler, & Allin, 2013).
5    Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi (2009, p. 216).
6    OECD (2013, p. 164).
7    The latest OECD list of reporting countries is available as 
an online annex to this report. See http://worldhappiness.
report/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/04/Updat-
ed-slide-use-and-implementation.pptx 
8    See Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs (2015, Chapter 2, p.14-16). 
That chapter of World Happiness Report 2015 also explained, 
on pp. 18-20, why we prefer direct measures of subjective 
well-being to various indexes of well-being. 
9    The Gallup Organization kindly agreed to include the life 
satisfaction question in 2007 to enable this scientific issue 
to be addressed. Unfortunately, it has not yet been 
possible, because of limited space, to establish satisfaction 
with life as a core question in the continuing surveys.
10    See Table 10.1 of Helliwell, Barrington-Leigh, Harris, & 
Huang (2010, p. 298).
11    See Table 1.2 of Diener, Helliwell, & Kahneman (2010), 
which shows at the national level GDP per capita cor-
relates more closely with WVS life satisfaction answers 
than with happiness answers. See also Figure 17.2 of 
Helliwell & Putnam (2005, p. 446), which compares 
partial income responses within individual-level equations 
for WVS life satisfaction and happiness answers. One 
difficulty with these comparisons, both of which do show 
bigger income effects for life satisfaction than for happi-
ness, lies in the different response scales. This provides 
one reason for differing results. The second, and likely 
more important, reason is that the WVS happiness 
question lies somewhere in the middle ground between an 
emotional and an evaluative query. Table 1.3 of Diener et 
al. (2010) shows a higher correlation between income and 
the ladder than between income and life satisfaction using 
Gallup World Poll data, but this is shown, by Table 10.1 of 
Helliwell et al. (2010), to be because of using non-matched 
sets of respondents.
12    See, for an example using individual-level data, 
Kahneman & Deaton (2010), and for national-average data 
Table 2.1 of Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2015, p. 22) or 
Table 2.1 of this chapter.
13    Barrington-Leigh (2013) documents a significant upward 
trend in life satisfaction in Québec, compared to the rest 
of Canada, of a size accumulating over 25 years to an 
amount equivalent to more than a trebling of mean 
household income.
14    See Lucas (2007) and Yap, Anusic, & Lucas (2012).
15    See Lucas et al. (2003) and Clark & Georgellis (2013).
16    See Yap et al. (2012) and Grover & Helliwell (2014).
17    See International Organization for Migration (2013, 
chapter 3) and Frank, Hou, & Schellenberg (2015).
18    See Stone, Schneider, & Harter (2012) and Helliwell & 
Wang (2015). The presence of day-of-week effects for 
mood reports is also shown in Ryan, Bernstein, & Brown 
(2010). 
19    See Stone et al. (2012), Helliwell & Wang (2014) and Boni-
kowska, Helliwell, Hou, & Schellenberg (2013).
20    Table 2.1 of this chapter shows that a set of six variables 
descriptive of life circumstances explains 74 percent of the 
variations over time and across countries of national average 
life evaluations, compared to 50 percent for a measure of 
positive emotions and 21 percent for negative emotions. 
21    Using a global sample of roughly 650,000 individual 
responses, a set of individual-level measures of the same six 
life circumstances (using a question about health problems 
to replace healthy life expectancy) explains 19.5 percent of 
the variations in life evaluations, compared to 7.4 percent 
for positive affect, and 4.6 percent for negative affect. 
22    As shown in Table 2.1 of the first World Happiness Report. 
See Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs (2012, p. 16).
23    For these comparisons to be meaningful, it should be the 
case that life evaluations relate to life circumstances in 
roughly the same ways in diverse cultures. This important 
issue was discussed some length in World Happiness Report 
2015. The burden of the evidence presented was that the 
data are internationally comparable in structure despite 
some identified cultural differences, especially in the case 
of Latin America. Subsequent research by Exton, Smith, & 
Vandendriessche (2015) confirms this conclusion. 
24    Gallup weights sum up to the number of respondents 
from each country. To produce weights adjusted for 
population size in each country for the period of 2012-
2015, we first adjust the Gallup weights so that each 
country has the same weight (one-country-one-vote) in 
the period. Next we multiply total population aged 15+ in 
each country in 2013 by the one-country-one-vote weight. 
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We also produce the population weights for the period of 
2005-2011, following the same process, but using total 
population in 2008 for this period. Total population aged 
15+ is equal to the proportion of population aged 15+ 
(=one minus the proportion of population aged 0-14) 
multiplied by the total population. To simplify the 
analysis, we use population in 2008 for the period of 
2005-11 and population in 2013 for the period of 2012-
2015 for all the countries/regions. Data are mainly taken 
from WDI (2015). Specifically, the total population and 
the proportion of population aged 0-14 are taken from the 
series “Population ages 0-14 (percent of total)” and 
“Population, total” respectively from WDI (2015). There 
are a few regions which do not have data in WDI (2015), 
such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Somalil-
and, and Taiwan. In this case, other sources of data are 
used if available. The population in Taiwan is 23,037, 031 
in 2008 and 23, 373, 517 in 2013, and the aged 15+ is 
19,131,828 in 2008 and 20,026,916 in 2013 respectively 
(Statistical Yearbook of the Republic Of China 2014). The 
total population in 2013 in Northern Cyprus is 301,988 
according to Economic and Social Indicators 2014 published 
by State Planning Organization of Northern Cyprus in 
December 2015 (p. 3). The ratio of population 0-14 is not 
available in 2013, so we use the one in 2011, 18.4 percent, 
calculated based on the data in 2011 Population Census, 
reported in Statistical Yearbook 2011 by State Planning 
Organization of Northern Cyprus in April 2015 (p. 13). 
There are no reliable data on population and age structure 
in Nagorno-Karabakh and Somaliland region, therefore 
these two regions are not included in the calculation of 
world or regional distributions.
25    The statistical appendix contains alternative forms 
without year effects (Appendix Table 9), and a repeat 
version of the Table 2.1 equation showing the estimated 
year effects (Appendix Table 8). These results confirm, as 
we would hope, that inclusion of the year effects makes 
no significant difference to any of the coefficients.
26    As shown by the comparative analysis in Table 7 of the 
Statistical Appendix.
27    The definitions of the variables are shown in the notes to 
Table 2.1, with additional detail in the online data appendix.
28    This influence may be direct, as many have found, e.g. De 
Neve, Diener, Tay, & Xuereb (2013). It may also embody 
the idea, as made explicit in Fredrickson’s broaden-and-
build theory (Fredrickson, 2001), that good moods help to 
induce the sorts of positive connections that eventually 
provide the basis for better life circumstances. 
29    We put the contributions of the six factors as the first 
elements in the overall country bars because this makes it 
easier to see that the length of the overall bar depends 
only on the average answers given to the life evaluation 
question. In World Happiness Report 2013 we adopted a 
different ordering, putting the combined Dystopia+resid-
ual elements on the left of each bar to make it easier to 
compare the sizes of residuals across countries. To make 
that comparison equally possible in World Happiness 
Report 2015 and World Happiness Report 2016 Update, we 
include the alternative form of the figure in the on-line 
statistical appendix (Appendix Figures 1-3) .
30    These calculations are shown in detail in Table 13 of the 
on-line Statistical Appendix.
31    The prevalence of these feedbacks was documented in 
Chapter 4 of World Happiness Report 2013, De Neve et al. 
(2013).
32    The data and calculations are shown in detail in Table 14 
of the Statistical Appendix. Annual per capita incomes 
average $44,000 in the top 10 countries, compared to 
$1,600 in the bottom 10, measured in international 
dollars at purchasing power parity. For comparison, 94 
percent of respondents have someone to count on in the 
top 10 countries, compared to 60 percent in the bottom 
10. Healthy life expectancy is 71.6 years in the top 10, 
compared to 53 years in the bottom 10.  93 percent of the 
top 10 respondents think they have sufficient freedom to 
make key life choices, compared to 63 percent in the 
bottom 10. Average perceptions of corruption are 36 
percent in the top 10, compared to 74 percent in the 
bottom 10.
33    Actual and predicted national and regional average 
2013-2015 life evaluations are plotted in Figure 4 of the 
on-line Statistical Appendix. The 45 degree line in each part 
of the Figure shows a situation where the actual and 
predicted values are equal. A predominance of country dots 
below the 45 degree line shows a region where actual values 
are below those predicted by the model, and vice versa.   
34    Mariano Rojas has correctly noted, in partial exception to 
our earlier conclusion about the structural equivalence of 
the Cantril ladder and satisfaction with life, that if our 
figure could be drawn using satisfaction with life rather 
than the ladder it would show an even larger Latin 
American premium (based on data from 2007, the only 
year when the GWP asked both questions of the same 
respondents). It is also true that looking across all 
countries, satisfaction with life is on average higher than 
the Cantril ladder scores, by an amount that is higher at 
higher levels of life evaluations.
35    For example, see Chen, Lee, & Stevenson (1995).
36    One slight exception is that the negative effect of corruption 
is estimated to be slightly, larger, although not significantly 
so, if we include a separate regional effect variable for Latin 
America. This is because corruption is worse than average 
in Latin America, and the inclusion of a special Latin 
American variable thereby permits the corruption coeffi-
cient to take a higher value. We also find that the separate 
regional variable for Latin America also sharply and 
significantly increases the estimated negative well-being 
impact of the standard deviation of life evaluations. 
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37    There are thus, as shown in Table 15 of the Statistical 
Appendix, 31 countries that are in the 2013-2015 ladder 
rankings of Figure 2.2 but without changes shown in 
Figure 2.3. These countries for which changes are missing 
include  some of the 10 lowest ranking countries in Figure 
2.2. Several of these countries might well have been 
shown among the 10 major losers had their earlier data 
been available.
38    See Helliwell, Huang, & Wang (2014).
39    In the 2013-15 GWP surveys, Iceland and Ireland are 
ranked first and fifth, respectively, in terms of social 
support, with over 95 percent of respondents having 
someone to count on, compared to an international 
average of 80 percent.
40    See Yamamura, Tsutsui, Yamane, Yamane, & Powdthavee 
(2015) and Uchida, Takahashi, & Kawahara (2014).
41    See Ren & Ye (2016) for an assessment of the happiness 
effects of the increased generosity following the 2008 
Wenchuan earthquake.
42    As shown in Tables 19-20 of the Statistical Appendix, 
these results are based on treating each country equally 
when assembling the averages.
43    Those results were drawn from Helliwell, Huang, Grover, 
& Wang (2014).
44    See United Nations (2013).
45    The World Bank (2014) has emphasized the measure-
ment and eradication of extreme poverty. 
46    See Keeley (2015) for a survey of recent OECD data and 
research on inequality.
47    See Atkinson (2015), Atkinson & Bourguignon (2014), 
Deaton (2013), Piketty (2014), Stiglitz (2013, 2015), and 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). For an earlier review from 
a sociological perspective, see Neckerman & Torche 
(2007).
48    See, e.g. Marmot, Ryff, Bumpass, Shipley, & Marks 
(1997).
49    See Roemer & Trannoy (2013) for a theoretical survey, and 
Putnam (2015) for data documenting declining equality 
of opportunity in the United States. For a survey of 
research on intergenerational mobility, see Corak (2013). 
50    See Kuznets (1955).
51    For a review of the arguments and evidence, see Keeley 
(2015).
52    See OECD (2015), p. 34.
53    See United Nations (2013, Figure 2.1). If the national Gini 
coefficients are weighted by national population, the 
global measure has been declining continuously, mainly 
through the impact of China. Still using population 
weights, but excluding China, the global average peaked 
in 2010 (just as did the unweighted average) and fell more 
rapidly than the unweighted average to a level that was 
nonetheless slightly higher in 2010 than it was in 1980.




55    This is because it is almost impossible to compare price 
levels when there is very little overlap in the products 
consumed to sustain standards of living in different 
countries. See Deaton (2010).
56    See Clark, Flèche, & Senik (2014).
57    See Goff, Helliwell, & Mayraz (2016).
58    This proposition was first advanced and tested by Alesina, 
Di Tella, & MacCulloch (2004) to explain why income 
inequality was estimated by them to have a greater impact 
on subjective well-being in Europe than in the United 
States. 
59    See Rothstein & Uslaner (2005).
60    See Helliwell & Wang (2011).
61    See Goff et al. (2016), Table 6.
62    The negative effect of well-being inequality becomes 
significant only when regional dummy variables are also 
included, as also found by Goff et al. (2016). That paper 
includes income and regional dummy variables for all 
regions, but none of the other variables used in Table 2.1. 
We find that the only necessary regional variable is for 
Latin America, which has inexplicably high life evalua-
tions (i.e. most countries have actual ladder values above 
those predicted by the equation of Table 2.1) and also 
unusually high inequality of subjective well-being. The 
coefficient on well-being inequality rises if the variables 
for freedom and social support are removed, showing that 
these are in part the likely routes via which well-being 
inequality reduces well-being. If the Latin American 
countries are compared with each other, people are 
nonetheless happier in those countries with more equal 
distributions of well-being, consistent with earlier 
findings by Graham & Felton (2006).
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63    We test two different measures of income inequality in 
our Table 2.1 equation. The first is from the World Bank, 
the same source used by Goff et al. (2016), and it shows 
for us, as it generally did for them, no significant negative 
effect, whether or not the inequality of well-being is also 
included in the equation. The second measure, as 
described in the Statistical Appendix, is based on Gini 
coefficients constructed from the incomes reported by 
individual respondents to the Gallup World Poll. That 
variable attracts a significant negative coefficient whether 
or not subjective well-being inequality is included, and it 
is stronger than the subjective well-being inequality when 
the two measures are both included, as shown in Table 10 
of the Statistical Appendix.
64    See Table 10 of the Statistical Appendix.
65    We use the standard deviation as our preferred measure 
of well-being inequality, following Kalmijn & Veenhoven 
(2005) and Goff et al (2016). See also Delhey & Kohler 
(2011) and Veenhoven (2012). Since we are anxious to 
avoid mechanical negative correlation between average 
well-being and our measure of inequality, the standard 
deviation is a more conservative choice than the coeffi-
cient of variation, which is the standard deviation divided 
by the mean, and the Gini, which mimics the coefficient 
of variation very closely.
66    The 95 percent confidence intervals for standard 
deviations and changes in standard deviations are all 
estimated by bootstrapping methods (1,000 times).
67    The cross-sectional correlation between the average 
ladder for 2013-2015 and the standard deviations of 
within-country ladder scores is -0.25. 
68    If the Gallup World Poll questions relating to corruption, 
freedom and social support had been asked on a 0 to 10 
scale, rather than as either 0 or 1, we might have been 
able to see if the inequality of life evaluations was based 
on some combination of the inequalities of the main 
supporting variables.
69    Figure 2.4 in the first World Happiness Report shows the 
2005-2011 values for the standard deviations of the ladder 
data in each country.  Table 2.8 in World Happiness Report 
2013 shows changes in the income Ginis by global region.
70    Note also the wide standard error bars for the Icelandic 
changes, reflecting the relative infrequency and some-
times half-size of the survey samples there. Even with 
these smaller samples, the change shown in Figure 2.7 
for Iceland is significantly positive.
71    See Dussaillant & Guzmán (2014). In the wake of the 
2010 earthquake in Chile, there was looting in some 
places and not in others, depending on initial trust levels. 
Trust subsequently grew in those areas where helping 
prevailed instead of looting. 
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What should be the purpose of our lives and 
what is the source of our ethical obligations? In 
the 19th century most people would have given a 
broadly similar answer to these questions: “We 
should live as God commands and, if we do, we 
shall find our reward in the life hereafter.”1 These 
beliefs were sustained by frequent attendance at 
church, mosque or temple, which provided a 
combination of uplift, comfort, social support 
and, in some cases, fear.
Since the 19th century things have changed 
substantially, especially in the West. Modern 
science has challenged the belief in a God who 
intervenes, and in a life after death. Though 59% 
of the world’s population still describe them-
selves as religious, the proportion has fallen in 
most parts of the world, and this trend is likely 
to continue.2 Where religious belief declines, a 
new view of ethics emerges. The rules of be-
haviour are then seen as made by man rather 
than by God in order to improve the quality of 
our human life together.
But how well can these rules survive without the 
religious sanction? To some extent they persist 
by force of habit. But their hold is weakening. In 
1952 half of all Americans thought people led 
“as good lives - moral and honest - as they used 
to.” There was no majority for the view that 
things are going to the dogs. But, as the table 
shows, by 1998 there was a three-to-one majority 
for precisely that view - that people are less 
moral than they used to be.3
Percentage saying that people lead “as good lives-moral and 





Clearly there has developed, to a degree, a moral 
vacuum, into which have stepped some quite 
unwholesome ideas. 
Many of these ideas are highly individualistic, 
with an excessive emphasis on competition and 
on personal success as the key goal in life. In 
this view each person’s main obligation is to 
themselves. An extreme proponent of this view 
is the writer Ayn Rand, who became the favour-
ite guru of the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan. In this world individuals do of 
course collaborate sometimes, but only when it 
is in their own individual interest. There is no 
concept of the common good, and life is largely 
a struggle for places on the ladder of success.
But such a struggle is a zero-sum game, since if 
one person rises another must fall. In such a 
world it is impossible that all should progress. 
Instead, if all are to progress, it has to be 
through a positive-sum game where success for 
one brings success for others. 
So we need a new ethics which incorporates the 
best values to be found in all religions, but which 
is equally convincing to people with no religious 
faith at all. As the Dalai Lama has put it, 
“For all its benefits in offering moral guidance 
and meaning in life, religion is no longer 
adequate as a basis for ethics. Many people no 
longer follow any religion. In addition, in 
today’s secular and multicultural societies, 
any religion-based answer to the problem of 
our neglect of inner values could not be 
universal, and so would be inadequate. We 
need an approach to ethics that can be equally 
acceptable to those with religious faith and 
those without. We need a secular ethics.”4
So there are two key questions that need answering.
First, what ethical beliefs could best represent 
universal values in a way that is based on 
human need and not divine command?
And, second, what kinds of secular organisa-
tion are needed to promote and sustain ethical 
living in the way that churches, mosques and 
temples can?
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The greatest happiness principle
So, first, what ethical idea based on human need 
can best fill the moral vacuum left by the decline 
of religious belief? The answer must surely be 
the great central idea of the 18th century An-
glo-Saxon Enlightenment on which much of 
modern Western civilisation is based.5 This can 
be expressed in three propositions. 
   We should assess human progress by the 
extent to which people are enjoying their 
lives—by the prevalence of happiness and, 
conversely, the absence of misery.
   Therefore, the objective of governments 
should be to create conditions for the great-
est possible happiness and the least possible 
misery. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “The 
care of human life and happiness … is the 
only legitimate object of good government”.6
   Likewise the obligation of each of us is to 
create the greatest amount of human happi-
ness that we can in the world and the least 
misery. (Overall happiness of course includes 
our own.) 
And in all of this it is more important to reduce 
unhappiness (or misery) than to increase the 
happiness of those who are already higher up 
the scale.7
These three propositions are what may be called 
the “greatest happiness principle”. It was Propo-
sition 1 which inspired many organisations, like 
the OECD, the EU and many governments, to 
reassess their answer to the question: what is 
progress? And it was Propositions 1 and 2 which 
have mainly inspired the production of succes-
sive World Happiness Reports - our hope has 
been to display enough of the new science of 
happiness to enable policy-makers to make 
happiness a practical goal of policy.8 But it is 
Proposition 3 that we wish to promote in this 
chapter, because we believe it should be the 
central principle which inspires those billions 
worldwide for whom religion no longer provides 
the answer to how we should live.9
The principle is frequently misunderstood.10 For 
example, it does not assume that people are only 
concerned about their own happiness. On the 
contrary, if people only pursued their own 
happiness, this would not produce a very happy 
society. Instead the greatest happiness principle 
exhorts us to care passionately about the happi-
ness of others. It is only if we do so that true 
progress (as we have defined it) can occur.
But what is so special about happiness? Why not 
judge our progress by our wealth or our freedom 
or our health or education, and not just our 
happiness? Clearly many things are good. But 
different goods are often in competition. My 
spending more on health may mean spending 
less on education. Or wealth-creation may 
require some limitations on freedom. So we 
have to ask why different things are good? And 
in most cases we can give sensible answers. For 
example ‘Wealth makes people feel good’ or ‘Ill 
health makes people feel bad.’ But if we ask why 
it matters how people feel—why happiness is 
good—we can give no answer. It is just self-evi-
dent. So happiness is revealed as the overarch-
ing good, and other goods obtain their goodness 
from the fact that they contribute to happiness. 
And that is why an “impartial spectator” would 
judge a state of human affairs by the happiness 
of the people.11
The greatest happiness principle has a universal 
appeal. It has the capacity to inspire, by mobilis-
ing the benevolent part of every human being. 
In the language of Jews, Christians and Mus-
lims, it embodies the commandment to Do as 
you would be done by, and to Love your neigh-
bour as yourself. In the language of Hinduism 
and Buddhism, it embodies the principle of 
compassion—that we should in all our dealings 
truly wish for the happiness of all of those we 
can affect, and we should cultivate in ourselves 
an attitude of unconditional benevolence.12 
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Is there any prospect that we can achieve such a 
caring way of life? Many people are skeptical. 
They believe that human nature is inherently 
selfish and we should just accept that fact. After 
all, it is the fittest who survive, and those must 
be the people who put No 1 first. But this crude 
form of Darwinism is quite contrary to the 
modern understanding of human nature and of 
human evolution, since it is the human instinct 
to cooperate which has given humans their 
extraordinary power over most other vertebrate 
species.13 The fact is that we have two natures, 
one selfish and one altruistic, and it is the 
function of our ethical culture to promote the 
altruist within us over the egotist.
In this context, an ethical system that favours 
not only others’ happiness but also our own has 
a much better chance of being implemented 
than one that is pure hair-shirt. It is therefore a 
huge advantage of the greatest happiness princi-
ple that it requires self-compassion as well as 
compassion towards others.
Organisations for ethical living
Not all readers will agree with the greatest 
happiness principle. But we can all agree on one 
thing. In an ever more secular society we urgent-
ly need non-religious organisations which 
promote ethical living in a way that provides 
inspiration, uplift, joy and mutual support—
through regular meetings of like-minded people.
Such organisations should not be anti-religious—
they should simply meet a human need which, 
for many people, religion cannot meet.
There are as yet surprisingly few secular organi-
sations that perform this role. Sunday Assem-
blies are one attempt.14 ‘Humanist’ organisations 
are another, but many of these focus mainly on 
attacking religion. Increasingly, Westerners are 
turning for spiritual support to non-theistic 
Buddhist or mindfulness groups. Other support-
ive organisations include Alcoholic Anonymous 
and other anonymous groups, but they cater 
only to people with specific problems. Then 
there are of course millions of charities like the 
Red Cross/Red Crescent which provide inspiring 
examples of ethical living, but again they are 
devoted to fairly specific causes. There are also 
general purpose ethical organisations like Rotary 
International or the Freemasons, but they have 
limited membership.
By contrast, churches, mosques and temples are 
open to all and their message is universal—it 
relates to every aspect of life and provides a 
sense of meaning, uplift and connection. We 
need equivalent secular organisations. There 
must be many more such organisations than I 
have mentioned, and by the end of this century 
they will surely be everywhere.
Action for Happiness
One such pioneering organisation is Action for 
Happiness (www.actionforhappiness.org), 
founded five years ago. Each member pledges to 
“try to create more happiness and less unhappi-
ness in the world around me.” To support this, 
the movement offers online a combination of 
modern positive psychology and traditional 
wisdom from both West and East. And, to 
facilitate the development of groups which meet 
regularly face-to-face, it offers an 8-session 
course on Exploring What Matters, which can be 
led by any well-motivated volunteer. After the 
first sessions these groups continue to meet 
regularly, drawing on a standard format suggested 
by the movement. 
The patron of the movement is the Dalai Lama, 
who views it as a practical organisation promot-
ing many of his views on happier living. To date 
60,000 people in 170 countries have joined and 
made the pledge. 
It is impossible to foresee what pattern of 
secular spiritual organisations will develop over 
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the century. But history shows the necessity for 
humans of some organised form of spiritual life 
and regeneration. I would welcome information 
from other secular organisations which see this 
as their role.
Conclusion
We live in an increasingly irreligious age, but we 
have to ensure that it becomes more, and not 
less, ethical. So the world needs an ethical 
system that is both convincing and inspiring. In 
this chapter we offer the principle of the greatest 
happiness as one which can inspire and unite 
people of all ages from all backgrounds and all 
cultures. But to sustain people in living good 
lives, we need more than a principle. We need 
living organisations in which people meet 
regularly for uplift and mutual support. To 
create secular organisations of this type is surely 
one of the biggest challenges of the 21st century.
 
1    In Hinduism there are many gods, and in the stricter forms 
of Buddhism there are none. But in both faiths there is a 
reward in the next life.
2    WIN/Gallup International Global Index of Religiosity and 
Atheism (2012), Table 3 gives data comparing 2012 with 
2005 for 39 countries. In the majority religiosity had fallen. 
In the U.S. for example the proportion who called them-
selves religious fell from 73% to 60%. Similarly, weekly 
U.S. attendance at a place of worship fell from 43% to 36% 
(see Gallup Historical Trends www.gallup.com/poll/1690/
religion.aspx ). Cross-sectional evidence within countries 
worldwide shows that religious people are on average 
poorer, less-educated and older. This may help to explain 
the overall downward trend in religious belief. For evidence 
on whether religion improves happiness and why, see 
Diener et al. (2011).
3    Putnam (2000), p.139.
4    Dalai Lama (2012).
5    See for example McMahon (2006), Bentham (1789), Mill 
(1861).
6    Jefferson (1809).
7    The 18th century writers like Bentham used average 
happiness as the sole criterion for evaluating a state of 
affairs but we believe that the dispersion of happiness 
should also be given (negative) weight. See O’Donnell et al. 
(2014), Chapter 4.
8    For further discussion, see O’Donnell et al. (2014).
9    For a similar view, see Dalai Lama (2012).
10    For further discussion, see Layard (2011), Chapter 15.
11    For the idea of the impartial spectator, see Singer (1993).
12    Jinpa (2015).
13    See for example Ricard (2015).
14    These have regular gatherings in 68 chapters across 8 
countries www.sundayassembly.com .
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The study of Politics, Aristotle declared, is “to 
consider what form of political community is 
best of all for those who are most able to realize 
their ideal of life” (The Politics, Book II).1 This 
question has vexed philosophers, statesmen, 
politicians, and citizens from Aristotle’s time 
until ours. Machiavelli gave guidance to the 
Prince on maintaining power;2 Bentham gave 
guidance to the legislators on promoting “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number”;3 and 
Rawls and Nozick tried to establish principles  
of justice, for Rawls’ tested according to a “veil 
of ignorance,”4 and for Nozick according to the 
libertarian idea of consensual exchange.5 But 
largely missing from this long and great tradi-
tion of moral and political philosophy has been 
empirical evidence. The new science of Happi-
ness therefore adds critical empirical evidence  
to the search for the ideal political community.  
John Helliwell’s path-breaking work, featured  
in this and past World Happiness Reports,6 has 
documented that people’s own report of their 
life satisfaction – that is their Subjective 
Well-being (SWB) – reflects several dimensions 
of their lives. Happiness depends on individual 
factors such as personality, income, health, and 
the individual’s perceived freedom to make 
important life choices. Happiness also depends 
on social determinants such as the degree of 
trust in the community, and  
on political factors such as the government’s 
adherence to the rule of law. There is some 
evidence, discussed below, that happiness 
depends directly on nature as well, whether 
because of biophilia (love for nature as a facet  
of human nature) or because of the natural 
services provided by the environment. 
When economists think about human happi-
ness, they of course tend to emphasize the role 
of personal income; libertarians emphasize 
personal freedoms; sociologists emphasize 
social capital including generalized trust in the 
society; and political scientists emphasize the 
constitutional order and the control of corrup-
tion. Yet none of these disciplines do justice to 
the fact that happiness is multivalent, and that 
no single goal of society – economic efficiency, 
personal freedom, community trust, constitu-
tional rule, or others – by itself delivers the 
“good society” sought by Aristotle.7 
Happiness plays three roles on the path to the 
good society. First, as Aristotle emphasized, it is 
the Summum Bonum,8 the supreme good. 
Defining the sources of happiness has engaged 
the labors of philosophers since Aristotle first 
set out the goal in The Politics and The Nichoma-
chean Ethics. Yet human happiness has remained 
the end goal, the telos of social organization.  
Second, happiness has become metric, a quanti-
tative benchmark. Thanks to the work of hun-
dreds of psychologists and other social scientists 
in recent decades, we have arrived at systematic, 
tested and widely accepted measurements of 
self-reported (or subjective) happiness. The 
World Happiness Report has emphasized the two 
main dimensions of happiness: evaluative and 
affective. Evaluative happiness, for example as 
measured by the Cantril Ladder featured in the 
World Happiness Reports, asks individuals for 
an evaluation of the overall quality of one’s life. 
Affective happiness, by contrast, measures the 
fluctuating emotions at a point of time, includ-
ing both positive and negative emotions. 
Third, happiness metrics offers a way to test 
alternative theories of happiness and the social 
good. Moral philosophers from ancient times 
until now could argue their case, but not test 
their theories. Now we can use survey data  
on happiness to weigh alternative theories of 
“the good society.” In effect, happiness studies 
represent an important advance of moral philos-
ophy since age-old questions about human 
well-being can now be tested. 
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Theories of Happiness
There are of course many competing theories of 
human well-being, both secular and religious. 
To even describe these theories at any length and 
soundness would require a volume or volumes, 
not a brief note. Still, at grave risk of trivializa-
tion, I would like to argue that various theories 
put different relative weights on six dimensions 
of happiness.
Mindfulness. Many theories of happiness, 
including Buddhism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
Stoicism, traditional Christian theology, and 
Positive Psychology, emphasize the path to 
happiness through the cultivation of mindful-
ness, attitudes, values, habits, dispositions, and 
virtues. The emphasis is placed on character, 
mindfulness and mental health rather than the 
objective circumstances facing the individual, 
whether economic, social, or political.  
Consumerism. Anglo-American economics has 
long emphasized the role of personal income and 
market opportunities in enabling individuals to 
meet their needs. The emphasis is on the individual 
as a rational consumer, acting to maximize 
individual utility (or material preferences) subject 
to a budget constraint. Easing the consumer 
budget constraint (that is, raising income) is the 
key to raising well-being in this view. 
Economic freedom. For Mill, Nietzsche, Rand, 
Hayek, and Nozick in their very different and 
distinctive ways, happiness is achieved through 
personal freedom of action. In the extreme 
modern form, Libertarianism places liberty as 
the Summum Bonum, and as the key to social 
organization through a minimal state.
The dignity of work. Human beings are creators 
and explorers. They aim to discover, create, 
build, innovate, and change the world around 
them. Therefore, the quality of work life, the 
single biggest part of our waking adult lives, 
must surely count heavily for the quality of life. 
Drudgery and unemployment are shunned; 
stimulating work and decent work conditions 
are crucial for well-being. 
Good Governance. Aristotle declares in The 
Politics that: “the state is a creation of nature, 
and that man is by nature a political animal.” 
The state, emphasizes Aristotle, “comes into 
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, 
and continuing in existence for the sake of a 
good life.” The quality of governance is, 
therefore, key. The administration of justice, 
writes Aristotle, is “the principle of order in 
political society.”9 
Social trust. In the same vein, Aristotle declares 
that, “A social instinct is implanted in all men by 
nature.” The ability of men to live harmoniously 
with others in society is a key virtue. He who is 
sufficient for himself, Aristotle famously de-
clared, is “either beast or god.”10 
Theories of Happiness put emphasis on one  
or another of these various dimensions. The 
economists emphasize the importance of 
raising wealth and consumption; the libertarians, 
personal liberty; communitarians, the social 
capital; Calvinists, respectable work; Buddhists 
and virtue ethicists, the cultivation of mindful-
ness and virtue. Partisans of these contrasting 
approaches have long fought bitterly across 
ideological lines. Communitarians accuse 
libertarians of neglecting social capital; liber-
tarians accuse communitarians of undermin-
ing personal liberty. Even the levying of taxes 
to pay for public goods, according to libertari-
ans, is a denial of personal liberty. Libertarians 
may argue for generosity, including charity, and 
reciprocity, but only on the basis of explicit 
individual consent. 
A more incisive approach, I believe, is to em-
brace holism, that is, to recognize the fact that 
the cause of human well-being are complex and 
not reducible to a single dimension. To achieve 
happiness requires the cultivation of mindfulness 
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and virtue, to be sure; but it also requires an 
adequate command over material resources, as 
emphasized by economists; decent work; per-
sonal freedoms; good governance; and strong 
social ties. Of course there are difficult and 
unsolved complexities in meeting this multi-di-
mensional challenge, especially in a world of 193 
countries and 7.3 billion individuals. 
In 2015, two important documents – one reli-
gious, one secular – aimed to offer holistic 
approaches to human well-being. In his encycli-
cal Laudato Si’, Pope Francis calls for a “sustain-
able and integral development.”11 The Pope’s 
emphasis “integral” reflects the need to consider 
the human person in all contexts: as a moral 
agent, a member of society, an agent in the 
economy, and a part of nature itself, bound by 
natural laws and highly vulnerable to the degra-
dation of the physical environment. In the 
encyclical, Pope Francis notes that, “Interdepen-
dence obliges us to think of one world with a 
common plan.”12 One can say that the Pope’s call 
for a common plan was met by the second 
holistic document, Transforming Our World: the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which 
was adopted by the 193 UN member states on 
September 25, 2015 to guide global cooperation 
during the period January 1, 2016 to December 
31, 2030. At the core of the 2030 Agenda are 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).13 
Laudato Si’
Pope Francis issued an encyclical Laudato Si’ to 
“to enter into a dialogue with all people,” Catho-
lics and non-Catholics, “about our common 
home.”14 In this encyclical, Pope Francis unravels 
the mystery of a world that enjoys unprecedented 
technological prowess and yet is beset by pro-
found and growing anxieties, pervasive marginal-
ization of the vulnerable (such as migrants and 
those caught in human trafficking), fear of the 
future, and environmental destruction. 
Francis centers the problem on a false belief of 
the modern age that has put technocratic ap-
proaches and profits above all other human 
concerns. He terms this a “misguided anthropo-
centrism” that has given rise to a “cult of unlim-
ited power,” and the rise of a moral relativism 
“which sees everything as irrelevant unless it 
serves one’s own immediate interests. “The 
culture of relativism is the same disorder which 
drives one person to take advantage of another, 
to treat others as mere objects, imposing forced 
labour on them or enslaving them to pay their 
debts.”15
Instead, Francis calls for a new holism that he 
terms “integral ecology” and “integral human 
development.” By this he means an anthropolo-
gy (theory of human nature) that recognizes 
each person’s deep interconnections with others 
and with physical nature (“The Creation”). 
Francis bemoans the fact that specialization, 
“which belongs to technology,” also “makes it 
difficult to see the larger picture.”16
What is the larger picture? That “we can once 
more broaden our vision. We have the freedom 
needed to limit and direct technology; we can put 
it at the service of another type of progress, one 
which is healthier, more human, more social, 
more integral.” We break free from the dominant 
technocratic paradigm, writes Francis, when 
“technology is directed primarily to resolving 
people’s concrete problems, truly helping them 
live with more dignity and less suffering.”17
Such steps are crucial to return to the possibili-
ties of happiness. “There is also the fact,” writes 
Francis, “that people no longer seem to believe 
in a happy future; they no longer have blind 
trust in a better tomorrow based on the present 
state of the world and our technological abilities. 
There is a growing awareness that scientific and 
technological progress cannot be equated with 
the progress of humanity and history… Let us 
refuse to resign ourselves to this, and continue 
to wonder about the purpose and meaning of 
everything.”18
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Where lie the answers for Pope Francis? He 
places his emphasis on an integral ecology that 
cares for the poor, protects culture, directs 
technologies towards their highest purposes, 
overcomes consumerism, returns dignity to 
work, and protects the environment. An overar-
ching theme is that the unifying principle of 
social ethics is “the common good,” which he 
quotes the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council’s 
definition as “the sum of those conditions of 
social life which allow social groups and their 
individual member’s relatively thorough and 
ready access to their own fulfillment.” Society as 
a whole is “obliged to defend and promote the 
common good.”19  
It is worth noting Francis’ special emphasis on 
work as an empowering source of well-being. 
Francis writes as follows:
We need to remember that that men and 
women have ‘the capacity to improve their 
lot, to further their moral growth and to 
develop their spiritual endowments’ (quoting 
Pope Paul VI).20 Work should be the setting 
for this rich personal growth, where many 
aspects of life enter into play: creativity, 
planning for the future, developing our 
talents, living out our values, relating to 
others, giving glory to God. It follows that, in 
the reality of today’s global society, it is 
essential that “we continue to prioritize the 
goal of access to steady employment for 
everyone” (quoting Benedict XVI), no matter 
the limited interests of business and dubious 
economic reasoning.21
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development
The affinity between the 2030 Agenda and Lauda-
to Si’ is striking. While Pope Francis speaks of 
integral development, the UN member states 
adopted the language of “sustainable develop-
ment” (a term that Francis also uses on occasion 
in Laudato Si’). By this term they mean the same 
holistic approach to economy, society, and envi-
ronment emphasized by Francis. The agenda is 
bold, multi-dimensional, and universal in cover-
age, meaning that all nations have agreed to 
participate so that no one is “left behind.” 
Here is what the nations mean by sustainable 
development: 
We resolve, between now and 2030, to end 
poverty and hunger everywhere; to reduce  
ill health, physical and mental; to combat 
inequalities within and among countries; to 
build peaceful, just and inclusive societies;  
to protect human rights and promote gender 
equality and the empowerment of women  
and girls; and to ensure the lasting protection 
of the planet and its natural resources. We 
resolve also to create conditions for sustainable, 
inclusive and sustained economic growth, 
shared prosperity and decent work for all, 
taking into account different levels of national 
development and capacities.22
While the language of the 2030 Agenda is about 
goals, timelines, human rights, and sovereign 
responsibilities, the agenda clearly embodies an 
implicit theory of human well-being, specifically 
that human well-being will be fostered by a 
holistic agenda of economic, social, and environ-
mental objectives, rather than a narrow agenda 
of economic growth alone. As spelled out in the 
17 Sustainable Development Goals, this implicit 
theory of happiness includes fighting poverty 
(SDG 1), promoting gender equality (SDG 5), 
emphasizing decent work for all (SDG 8), 
narrowing gaps of income and wealth in society 
(SDG 10), promoting environmental sustainabil-
ity (SDGs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15), fostering peaceful 
and inclusive societies (SDG 16) and enhancing 
global cooperation (SDG 17).23  
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Using Happiness Data to Examine 
Alternative Visions of Well-being
Happiness data offer a powerful new tool for 
examining alternative visions of human well-be-
ing. We can measure countries according to 
competing theories of happiness. I will focus on 
three prevalent theories: Economic Freedom (lib-
ertarianism), Wealth Generation (consumerism), 
and Sustainable Development (holism). 
Libertarians champion economic freedom, 
meaning the absence of coercion in resource 
allocation, including opposition to taxes and 
government spending as a matter of principle. 
The Wall Street Journal and the Libertarian-ori-
ented Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.) 
produced an Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) 
as a measure of each country’s adherence to 
standards of economic freedom. 
Economists emphasize real consumption and 
full employment as key conditions of happiness. 
The main societal goal is towards economic 
growth, which is seen as raising the consump-
tion possibilities of members of the society. The 
World Economic Forum produces an annual 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) that aims to 
capture the ability of each country to generate 
good jobs and high incomes for the population. 
Sustainable Development advocates claim that 
the happiness is achieved through a multi-di-
mensional focus on economic, social, and 
environmental objectives. The 17 SDGs express 
the idea that the “good society” should focus on 
the triple bottom line of economic prosperity, 
social inclusion, and environmental sustainabili-
ty. The UN Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (UN SDSN), which publishes the World 
Happiness Report, has created an SDG Index 
(SDGI) to track each country’s progress towards 
the 17 SDGs. 
If we consider these three alternative measures 
(IEF, GCI, and SDGI) as embodying alternative 
underlying “theories of happiness,” we can ask 
whether these alternative indexes help to explain 
the cross-country average levels of happiness. 
For example, are the countries that excel in 
economic freedom (with low tax rates, free trade, 
and few regulations) according to the IEF also 
those that achieve higher levels of happiness? 
Are countries that are more economically com-
petitive according to the GCI also the happier 
countries on average? Are countries that are 
farther along towards the SDGs according to the 
SDGI also higher on the happiness scale? 
A quick summary of these indicators is as follows. 
The IEF aims to assess “the liberty of individuals 
to use their labor or finances without undue 
restraint and government interference.” It is 
composed of 10 sub-indexes that may be 
grouped into four broad categories: Rule of law 
(property rights, freedom from corruption); 
Government size (fiscal freedom, government 
spending); Regulatory efficiency (business 
freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); 
and Market openness (trade freedom, invest-
ment freedom, financial freedom). The Wall 
Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington, D.C. jointly author the IEF. 
The GCI aims to measure the factors that contrib-
ute to a country’s global competitiveness, which 
the authors define as “the set of institutions, 
policies, and factors that determine the level of 
productivity of an economy, which in turn sets 
the level of prosperity that the country can earn.” 
As the Global Competitiveness Report describes, 
“the GCI combines 114 indicators that capture 
concepts that matter for productivity. These 
indicators are grouped into 12 pillars: institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, 
health and primary education, higher education 
and training, goods market efficiency, labor 
market efficiency, financial market development, 
technological readiness, market size, business 
sophistication, and innovation.” The World 
Economic Forum authors the GCI. 
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The SDG Index aims to measure SDG achieve-
ment across the 17 goals, using currently avail-
able national cross-country data. For each goal, 
one or more cross-country indicators are select-
ed and averaged to produce one sub-index per 
SDG. In turn, the 17 sub-indexes are then 
aggregated to produce an overall measure of 
SDG achievement. In this paper we aggregate 
the sub-indexes as a geometric average (that is, 
the 17 sub-indexes are multiplied together and 
then raised to power 1/17). The purpose is to 
assess each country’s achievement across the 
economic, social, and environmental objectives 
of the SDGs. The Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network Secretariat authors the SDG 
Index. 












SDG Index (SDSN) 0.051 ***   
(13.46)
- - 0.029 ***     
(5.22)
0.019 **       
(2.62)
GCI (Global Competitiveness 
Index 2015-2016)
- 1.267 ***    
(13.31)




IEF (Index of Economic 
Freedom 2016)
- - 0.069 ***    
(8.18)






- - - - 0.488 ***     
(4.05)
Unemployment Rate  
(IEF Data Set)
- - - - -0.037 ***         
(-3.67)
Adjusted R-squared 0.604 0.599 0.359 0.67 0.735
N 119 119 119 119 109
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
The basic regression results are shown in Table 
1. The LHS variable is the Cantril Ladder (CL) 
indicator of evaluative happiness as calculated by 
Helliwell et al in Chapter 2.24 The RHS variables 
in the initial regressions are the 2015 GCI, 2016 
IEF, and 2016 SDGI. In the case of the SDGI, 
which is built up from roughly 40 individual 
indicators, I make one adjustment, to remove 
the Cantril Ladder from the SDG Index itself, 
since CL is included among the individual 
indicators. The SDG Index used in the regres-
sions is therefore slightly different from the 
SDG Index as reported by the SDSN (2016). 
Note that constant terms are included in all 
regressions but not reported in the table. 
There are 119 countries with data for CL, GCI, 
IEF, and SDGI. In bivariate regressions of CL on 
the three indexes, both the SDGI and GCI 
account for around 60 percent of the variation 
of CL (regressions 1 and 2), while the IEF is a 
much weaker explanatory variable, accounting 
for only around 36 percent (regression 3). When 
all three indexes are included in regression (4), 
the GCI and SDGI are highly significant, while 
the IEF is not significant and has a negative 
sign. In other words, economic freedom per se 
does not seem to explain much, if anything, 
about cross-country happiness after controlling 
for national competitiveness (GCI) and progress 
towards the SDGs (SDGI). 
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This simple cross-country evidence suggests that 
both economic competitiveness and SDG 
achievement, but not economic freedom, explain 
aspects of well-being. To understand whether 
GCI and SDGI are capturing determinants of 
happiness beyond the standard macroeconomic 
determinants, we next add national income per 
capita and the unemployment rate to the regres-
sion. Do the GCI and SDGI help to explain 
cross-national happiness beyond their correla-
tion with national income per capita and with 
unemployment?
In regression (5) we see the results. Higher 
national income per capita and a lower unem-
ployment rate both contribute significantly to 
explaining cross-national variations in happi-
ness. Once those two variables are included on 
the RHS, the GCI lacks explanatory power, while 
SDGI remains statistically significant. The SDG 
Index contains information about well-being 
that goes beyond these two macroeconomic 
variables, while GCI does not. This finding is in 
line with the basic premise that that happiness 
depends not only on economic variables but on 
social and environmental factors as well. 
Future research will attempt to incorporate 
additional aspects of sustainable development 
into the research framework established in 
Chapter 2.25 Using the panel data reported, 
Helliwell et al have already demonstrated that 
health and social factors (trust, generosity, 
corruption) are key determinants of cross-coun-
try happiness. Notably, both healthy life expec-
tancy and corruption are part of the current SDG 
Index. In future studies we will examine wheth-
er other dimensions of the SDG Index – for 
example gender equality, clean air and water, 
and urban sustainability – add further explanato-
ry power to the cross-country happiness results 
in the panel data. We should also stress that 
some issues, such as the importance of mental 
health, can only be studied if we move from 
comparison between countries to comparisons 
between individuals.
Conclusions and Follow Up
As Helliwell et al (2013, 2015, 2016) emphasize, 
happiness is the product of many facets of 
society.  Income per capita matters, as econo-
mists emphasize, but so too do social condi-
tions, work conditions, health, pollution, and 
values (e.g. generosity). The libertarian argu-
ment that economic freedom should be champi-
oned above all other values decisively fails the 
happiness test: there is no evidence that eco-
nomic freedom per se is a major direct contribu-
tor of human well-being above and beyond what 
it might contribute towards per capita income 
and employment. Individual freedom matters 
for happiness, but among many objectives and 
values, not to the exclusion of those other 
considerations. Sustainable development and 
related holistic concepts (such as Pope Francis’s 
integral human development) are a better 
overarching guide to human wellbeing than the 
single-minded pursuit of income, or economic 
freedom, or other one-dimensional objective. 
We still have many crucial things to learn about 
the deep sources of human well-being. I believe 
that we should explore more deeply the specific 
characteristics of work that are favorable or 
unfavorable to happiness, for as Pope Francis 
emphasizes, the satisfaction with work is a 
fundamental source of human well-being. 
Arduous, dangerous labor, such as the physically 
difficult work of countless smallholder farmers, 
is likely to impinge directly and adversely on 
subjective well-being. We also need to explore in 
much more detail how the cultivation of mind-
fulness and personal virtues may contribute to 
long-term happiness. We should examine 
whether environmental degradation (e.g. air 
pollution) directly lowers well-being beyond the 
effects on human health and productivity. We 
have only touched the surface concerning the 
relationship of happiness and sustainable 
development, but the preliminary evidence is 
heartening: the SDGs are likely to help us move 
along a path of higher well-being as expressed by 
the world’s people themselves. 
64





6. World Happiness Reports (2013, 2015, 2016).




11. Pope Francis, 13. (2015).
12. Pope Francis, 164. (2015).
13. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.
14. Pope Francis (2015).
15. Pope Francis, 123. (2015).
16. Pope Francis, 110. (2015).
17. Pope Francis, 112. (2015).
18. Pope Francis, 113. (2015).
19. Pope Francis, 156. (2015).
20. Pope Paul VI (1967).
21. Pope Francis, 128. (2015).
22. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
23. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.
24. Helliwell, et al. (2016).
25. Helliwell, et al. (2016).
Data Annex
All variables are for the most recent years. They are taken 
from the following sources:
GCI: The Global Competitiveness Report (2015-2016). The World 
Economic Forum. http://reports.weforum.org/global-competi-
tiveness-report-2015-2016/
IEF: Index of Economic Freedom (2016). The Wall Street Journal 
and The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index/
about
LGDPpc (Log GDP per capita): Helliwell, J. F., Huang, H., & 
Wang, S. (2015). The geography of world happiness, World 
Happiness Report 2015. New York: Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network. http://worldhappiness.report/download/
Unemployment: Index of Economic Freedom (2016). The Wall 
Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation. http://www.
heritage.org/index/about
SDG Index: Sustainable Development Solutions Network. 
Preliminary Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Index and 
Dashboard (2016). http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/
sdg-index/
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